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1 Introduction 
 
 
"Securing the interaction between people and just about anything is a big problem. People don't 
understand computers. Computers are magical boxes that do things. People believe what 
computers tell them. People just want to get their jobs done. People don't understand risks. They 
may, in a general sense, when the risk is immediate. People lock their doors and latch their 
windows. They check that no-one is following them when they walk down a darkened alley. 
People don't understand subtle threats. They don't think that a package could be a bomb, or that 
the nice convenience store clerk might be selling credit card numbers to the mob on the side. 
And why should they? It almost never happens.” 
- Bruce Shneier (2000) 
 
At the turn of the millennium, lack of trust was considered one of the major obstacles to 
developing successful ecommerce enterprises (e.g., Ecommerce Trust Study 1999, Jarvenpaa 
and Tractinsky 1999, [P1], Nielsen 1999a). It was realised that in order for the ecommerce to 
flourish and any online service to be successful, creating trust would become means to an end 
– a necessity. Furthermore, it was realised that understanding the real-world trust would be 
crucial to understanding the actual security of any transactions online — maybe even more so 
than creating the technological solutions for these transactions (e.g. Friedman 2000, Salam et 
al 2003). Trust is one of the essential ingredients of the usability of security – a usability 
demand that is novel compared to “ordinary” usability measures. Trust forms the basis for all 
online transactions (Friedman 2000), and a trusting attitude towards computers in general may 
help put the user at ease when operating often complex systems – a description well suited to 
computer security applications. Trust is needed for using appliances that are critical security-
wise. To enhance it, we need to understand what trust in general is made of – how users 
perceive it, and how this relates to the trust expressed by machines.  
 
Current computer security technologies are complicated and were developed with the 
technologically advanced in mind. As use situations have grown more complex and risky, 
however, there has emerged a new need for the managing of security – and trust – to become 
more understandable all users. More and more "ordinary" people, without any former 
experience with security issues or technologies will have to learn to manage these security 
features now, when microchips can be everywhere, our environments and homes are flooded 
with ubiquitous technology, and the mobile technology is always with us in our pockets – 
wherever we go. User involvement is now often necessary, which has had the effect that trust 
issues are becoming more and more pending and explicit. This is happening also in the area of 
ecommerce and the online transactions it brings with it. No one will want to give away his or 
her credit card number to anyone, if there is no trust. The same applies for other types of 
private information, such as social security numbers or medical health data, for example. Yet, 
people would like to be able to fully utilise these new types of services and media for all types 
of transactions, also those requiring a high level of trust. 
 
Users are often considered to be the weakest link in the security of online transactions 
(Adams and Sasse 1999b), and rightly so, for what else could they be, when they are not 
provided with sufficient amount of information and support on making informed decisions in 
online situations. Users cannot be expected to be able to make rational choices of whether an 
operation is secure and trustworthy or not, if they are not given the information to base their 
decisions on. The demand for easy-to-use, easy-to-understand information is paramount for 
creating usable security. This requirement is well expressed in the following quote by Eric 
Ketelaar, in his demand for trustworthy information (Ketelaar 1997): 
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“Why do we demand more of the quality of food or a car than we demand of that other 
essential: information? Reliability and authenticity determine the credibility and the 
usefulness of information. These concepts, developed in different cultures and at different 
times, are essential for our information society in its dependence on trust in information. In 
the creation and distribution of digital information, conditions should be met to ensure the 
reliability and authenticity of the information.” 
 
Why indeed would we demand less from information, than we demand in other areas in our 
daily lives, in order to trust? Yet both the information and the means to deal with that 
information are often lacking, when a user encounters in interactions with computer security. 
Still today, there exists a huge gap between what users should know and what they do know 
about how computer security works. Users do, however, repeatedly report a craving for more 
understandable security information, in order to be able to make better decisions on online 
behaviours and access, and be better able to protect their children as well (Safer Internet 
2006). 
 
Until today, the technical representations of trust have not really had anything to do with trust 
as it is known in the world of users. The formal representations of trust have been based more 
on the formal models used than the real user requirements posed by the actual users [P3]. This 
has created a gap between the technical ways to express trust and in the way real people tend 
to express trust and to understand trust expressions of others. In order to increase usability of 
controlling trust, the technical representations will have to come closer and take into account 
the real-world users of the systems behind these representations. A lot of work has been done 
in fields of analysing and modelling trust in the technical sense and in providing 
infrastructures for expressing trust and authorisation in open systems in a machine-to-machine 
interaction (see e.g. [P3] for a number of references). However, due to more complicated use 
situations, this needs to be accomplished in the human-machine interaction also, in a way that 
is understandable to both the machine and the user. The users need to be able to handle 
security features of a given system in a novel way: to be able to manage, express and control 
trust. Furthermore, all this needs to be accomplished in a way that is understandable to the 
common man, not just to the technically advanced and knowledgeable user. Users have been 
reluctant to trust the services they cannot really fathom, and same goes for the concepts 
behind the initial countermeasures against this distrust, such as Trusted Third Parties (TTP) 
and Certificate Authorities (CA) that still remain unfamiliar to most online users. In effect, 
the sources of information for whether to trust or not cannot be these strange bodies of the 
virtual world, but the more familiar ones: the recommendations given by friends, colleagues, 
and family members; the daily news; even rumours and hearsay. As their first choice, people 
would trust other people, not machines, regardless of the media. 
 
If these gaps between what users know and understand and what they are provided with are 
not closed in a proper manner, we are facing two kinds of security risks [P5]: 
 
1. The users will not be able to handle trust issues in the right way, and will continue 
creating a security risk. Users will definitely be the “weakest link” in the chain of 
security in that case. 
2. Without getting to know the real users and the world they live in, as well as what 
“trust” means for the common person, we are not able to answer the security needs of 
users as fully as we can, if we know for whom we are designing.  
 
Through gathering knowledge about the real-world use situations with the methods provided 
by User-Centred Design (UCD), we will be likely to be able to create better and more easy-to-
use security services the properties and functionalities of which will be used to full extent, 
empowering the users. This means that in order to create the kind of services that will meet all 
these requirements, we will have to find out  
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• How users experience trust, what they consider relevant to the issues of trust, and in 
what kind of use situations trust is needed, and what this trust is made of, as well as  
• What kind of answers might we have for these needs in the technical world, or what 
kind of solutions would be likely to be most successful and relevant for the users. 
 
While gaining the trust of online users may be slow and painstaking from the entrepreneur's 
point of view, losing trust happens quickly. A single violation of trust may destroy the 
achievements of trust over a period of months or even years (Nielsen 1999a, Ecommerce 
Trust Study 1999, Cardholm 1999). Also, in an open network like the Internet you cannot 
trust everyone to be playing by the rules. Obviously, there is a need for some security 
mechanism to prevent others from doing harmful things in risky situations – either by mistake 
or on purpose. With technologies such as mobile code, software agents and distributed 
computing, there is a need to express, in a way understandable for the machines, who is 
allowed to do what and under what conditions – who is trusted and who is not. With the 
number of parties involved, it is impractical to base these decisions on traditional access 
control lists. Instead, these decisions should be based on the kind of recommendations and 
expressions of trust by other parties that are computational somehow [P3]. 
 
On basis of the work at hand, it is no surprise that we have witnessed the upsurge of such 
recommendation-based systems. In these, peers can build up the reputation of them and of 
each other by both being tracked for their activities, as well as by providing explicit 
statements of their actions and preferences, usually tied to the usage of a particular service, 
such as eBay (www.ebay.com) or Amazon (www.amazon.com), for example. Further, they 
can usually do this in their own language, in familiar terms and using real life expressions. 
However, even if such embedding of existing social networks into the online environment has 
proved successful, there remains a plethora of unanswered questions in the usage of these 
systems to promote trust as well.  
 
One such problem is that the trust is not truly transferable: the trust recommendations and 
reputation built in one system is usually accessible for that system alone. To start with, it will 
be difficult to integrate the various systems a singular user is interacting with one another 
technically. Also choosing what information to share between which systems is a difficult and 
represents possibly a risky choice from a user's perspective that may have notable 
repercussions on the privacy of that user. To give a simple example, currently many users 
have multiple online identities, which may be only partly overlapping and only loosely 
connected with each other, if at all. Exchanging information between such identities by 
accident might greatly damage the user's privacy – for good (Donath and Boyd 2004). The 
classical study by Good and Krekelberg (2003) already showed how easy it is for the user to 
make such mistakes – and never become aware of them. A further problem with 
recommendation-based systems is to decide how to rate the recommendations and how to find 
the best ones. A lot of work is ongoing in this area. For example (Friedman et al 2004),  
(Bonhard 2005, Bonhard et al 2005, 2006), (Riegelsberger et al 2006) and (Camp 2006) 
provide some examples of enriching the recommendations by finding ways to bring in more 
of the right type of information needed for better accuracy.  
 
Users may also base their trust on false assumptions and false impressions online or offline, 
and are not always behaving like model citizens, or even with their own best interest in mind. 
Users cannot really be trusted to flawlessly implement computer security policies, just as they 
cannot be trusted always to lock their car door or never to lose their keys. All users make 
mistakes sometimes; they cannot be trusted to do things precisely. People also misunderstand, 
forget things, are ashamed sometimes to admit they do not know something, and so on. 
People do not always behave in a rational way – they are also emotional and in real-life as 
well decide to trust fortune-tellers and suspicious-looking sales clerks. Malicious insiders are 
often implicitly trusted, as well, which opens up the opportunity for treachery. But that’s how 
humans are – trusting in the wrong situations and on wrong grounds; and benevolent actors 
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can lead to trust broken, and lost - even when they mean well and act with all the good 
intentions. In the same way, they cannot be trusted to make intelligent decisions about 
computer security – at least not all the time. 
 
People should also be distrustful at times. In his book The Art of Deception, Kevin Mitnick, a 
former hacker tells how easy it was to compromise computer security by using so-called 
“social engineering”: manipulating humans (Mitnick et al 2002). In practice, it means, for 
example, pretending to be someone else, someone trusted or someone with certain rights and 
to persuade the other person to do what they want, like give out confidential information such 
as a password, to be misused. A typical example of a social engineering attack is to use email 
attachments that contain malicious contents that might trigger the victim’s machine to start 
sending loads of spam for example,  
 
Such earlier attacks have led the software vendors to disable automatic execution of 
attachments. Now, users have to explicitly open and execute attachments for the attack to 
occur. This presents small hindrance, for in practice many users will do exactly this: open any 
attachments they receive without questions, thus allowing the attack to work as planned. 
Perhaps one of the simplest, but still a very effective social engineering trick is to lead a user 
into thinking that the attacker is an administrator and then request for a password for some 
purpose. Since this tends to work, users of Internet systems frequently receive messages that 
contain such a request for a password or credit card information, claiming to be in their best 
interest: to set up their account, or some other benign operation. These are so-called phishing 
attacks – the confidential information is fished out of the unsuspecting victim. In reality, 
administrators of computer systems rarely, if ever, need to know the user's password to 
perform administrative tasks – but this is something most users are unaware of. Work to fight 
against phishing is flourishing (e.g. Franco 2005, Hartman 2006, Dhamija et al 2006, Cranor 
et al 2007). 
 
Social engineering is quite effective, and people fall for it repeatedly – and not only people 
who are naïve in computer security, but the more knowledgeable ones, too. Mitnick, as a 
former hacker, is the right spokesperson in this matter: after all, via his former actions, he has 
proved that it is easy to fool humans to tell their passwords or risk the security in some other 
ways. The reason is they do not understand the risks, what is secure and what is not, and thus 
users cannot recognise a malicious attack – in any form it may take. Also, no matter how we 
define what we mean by security, at the core of the issue lies another problem: there may be a 
great difference between actual and perceived security. What this means is that the users’ 
ideas about what is secure and what is not might not have anything to do with the actual level 
of security of, say, a service on the Web (Shneier 2000). When seeking for enhancements to 
improve the usability of security, it is not enough to make things more user-friendly and 
easier to understand. We also need to prevent social engineering from taking place: minimise 
the possibilities for such human fallacies from ever occurring. Only when we reach this stage 
can we claim the level of usability of security to have truly risen to an acceptable level, and 
only then can we expect a significant rise for trust the users are ready to express towards 
online services.   
 
 
 
1.1 The scope of this work 
 
This work presents various ways to enhance the usability of security systems. The main focus 
of the work is on trust within the framework of usability and UCD. These problems and issues 
are approached mainly from the users’ point of view: how real people in real world trust, and 
how this knowledge might be applied to technical ways to express trust. Thus, the aim of this 
work is to broaden the view from a protocol-centric approach of online authentication towards 
considering the actual users, and to provide some initial requirements for future operating 
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systems and user interface design. A further goal is to find a better understanding of the 
makings of trust in online environments, and how they might be studied further within the 
paradigm of user-centred research. 
 
Trust research as part of usability of security is, essentially, a part of the discipline of 
usability, which falls under the field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), sometimes also 
called Computer-Human Interaction (CHI): studying trust from a user’s point of view means 
studying human behaviour and actions, perceptions, and feelings in relation to trust. HCI is 
usually defined as study of humans as users of computers (and other respective systems, 
devices, gadgets, applications and appliances, e.g. mobile phones, TV sets, cars, iPods, diving 
instruments or what have you); or vice versa, the study of how to make computers more 
usable via understanding their users. The latter can also be seen as the area of usability 
(engineering), where the object of study is to engineer the human needs or, in other words, the 
user requirements, into system design, preferably early on, to ensure better user experience of 
the product. This goal is thought in general to be reachable via bringing the system model as 
close as possible to the expected users’ mental model of the system (c.f. e.g. Norman 1986, 
Nielsen 1993 for classical treatises on this area). What this means in practice is that the goal is 
to create a match between the cognitive capabilities (expectancies, activities) of the user and 
the system behaviour.  
 
Usability can also be described as a subfield of “User Experience”, often abridged as UE or 
UX. UX is a recent trend, starting somewhere around the turn of the millennium, when 
classical usability was seen as too narrow in scope, and more emphasis was put into the areas 
of non-cognitive, affective factors (e.g. Norman 2004, Blythe et al 2003, Jordan 2000, Bødker 
et al 2003, Egger 2001). However, the terms HCI, usability, and UX are in practice often used 
interchangeably. This is not too problematic, since the goal is the same, with slightly different 
emphasis: to study and understand the human as user of some system, device, or application, 
and the interoperability of the two (e.g. Norman 2004, Saariluoma 2004). In this thesis, the 
terms usability or HCI are mainly used when referring to the study of humans in context of 
machines. The usage of two terms is to be understood in the following way: Usability is used 
when referring to the system features and how they are experienced, thus encompassing both 
Usability and UX. HCI is used as an umbrella term to cover the widest possible area of UCD, 
including usability and UX, and all other approaches and work done to bridge the gap 
between man and machine in the field of computer science.  
 
As trust is also part of usability of security, we need to have a closer look at this subfield and 
what it enfolds. Usability of security, or usable security, as it is often also called nowadays, 
can be divided into areas that have been dealt with within this area of study as more or less 
unconnected patches (e.g. as in Cranor & Garfinkel 2005). These include: 
 
1. User interfaces for managing computer security; their design and usability testing;  
2. Problems of authenticating from a user point-of-view, especially usability issues 
related to passwords; 
3. Trustworthiness and trust issues of ecommerce and other online transactions; 
4. Privacy issues 
 
From these, this thesis is concentrating mainly only on the study of trust, and other lines of 
research inside usability of security fall outside the scope of the study for the most part and 
are dealt with only in relation to dealing with trust issues, as necessary. The excluded areas 
include usability of authentication (e.g. Basu & Muylle 2003, Ferscha et al 2005), usability of 
passwords (e.g. Brostoff & Sasse 2003), technical development of trust management (e.g. 
Nielsen & Krukow 2003; Weippl and Essmayr 2003, Anderson 2003), as well as privacy (e.g. 
Adams & Sasse 2001, Camp 2003).  
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Further, the differences between technical and human ways to express trust are explored, and 
how the two might be combined. The work is multi-disciplinary in that it takes its sources and 
background assumptions from the fields of computer science, telecommunications, computer 
security and human-computer interaction, and even from sociology, psychology, and 
philosophy. The main application area of the study is ecommerce. However, the users are 
investigated mostly as users, not so much as consumers. This means in practice that e.g. 
methods of areas such as marketing research and economics are not at the core of this work, 
even if work from these areas is touched upon occasionally. Furthermore, the viewpoint is 
that of a single user interacting with the system, not users acting as a tight group in a cohesive 
manner. 
 
The aim of this work was to see, what and how can be found out about trust in the online 
environment, and which usability and UCD methods provide what kind of results. The goal 
was to be able to show, how and when these methods should be applied. The goal of this 
work was thus not to create a generic framework of trust, since such frameworks already 
exist, e.g. (Riegelsberger 2005), (Jarvenpaa and Tractinsky 1999, 2000), (Gefen 2002), Camp 
(2000). The aim of this work was also not to provide generic guidelines for creating 
trustworthy design, since this has already been done quite well by e.g. Egger (2003) and 
Camp (2003b). However, this work is a) corroborating the results of these two works via a 
different set of methodology and b) concentrating on showing how different types of usability 
and UCD methods can be applied in the various parts of trust-formation online. The work can 
be seen as a continuation of the work conducted by Jarvenpaa et al, adopting a similar line of 
study especially in regard to the multi-cultural issues, as well as what comes to the chosen 
methodologies and setting of the research questions (Jarvenpaa et al 1999, 2000). 
 
 
1.2 The chronological line of research 
  
This work is based on nine publications that present various approaches to the concept of trust 
from a user-centred viewpoint. One aim of this work was to see how the existing usability 
methods can be applied to the field of usability in computer security and what kind of 
information they produce. The publications draw a logical and chronological outline from the 
initial, general-level user interviews on trust issues through actual usability testing of security 
user interfaces to analysis of the conclusions and results on a general level. The work also 
presents a review of the previous work on this topic. 
 
The purpose of the first user study was to find out about trust in the form of enquiring about 
users’ current understanding of the security of the Internet as well as to learn about their 
behaviour patterns concerning their usage of the Web and areas that seemed relevant to this 
usage. These include areas such as use of e-mail, use of banking services, and use of credit 
cards. As our method, we used qualitative user interviews. The users were also presented with 
a mock-up user interface for a web-based service (group 1) or with existing web services 
(group 2), in order to trigger conversation about ecommerce and security issues related to the 
transactions of money or private information online. The users were inquired about their 
current knowledge of computers and banking habits, in order to find out about the possible 
similarities in behaviour in the case of using money regardless of the media. The notion of 
trust was discussed upon on many levels, including questions about trusting friends, work 
colleagues, a bank or a service-provider on the Web.   
 
The first user interviews and evaluations (group 1) took place in June 1999 and the second in 
September 1999. In-between the results of the first user study were analysed and compared 
with existing literature. The second set of user interviews (group 2) was then planned with the 
alterations mentioned above. These user studies are reported in [P1]. The ethical implications 
of promoting trust were discussed in [P2], and the whole research setting of bringing human 
trust closer to machine trust was discussed in [P3]. 
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In order to see if the results would be valid in another country, and also to see how cultural 
variation might take place, the user study was repeated in Sweden in 2000, with slightly 
different user group, different sites familiar to the Swedish users, in Swedish language, and by 
Swedish collaborators. The outcome of this study was that there was indeed quite a lot of 
difference which is likely to stem from cultural variation, but due to the different user group 
these results can only be considered as indicative. The Swedish user study is described in 
detail in [P4].  
 
[P5] presents a concentration on the usability of the actual trust mechanisms currently in use 
on basis of the findings of the user studies conducted. [P6] reports the resulting UI design 
built on basis of the research, and the outcomes of the usability tests conducted on this design. 
The significant findings on the importance of aesthetics for the trust-making decision, as well 
as an elaboration on how to deal with the different tastes and likes behind aesthetic 
evaluations are discussed in [P7]. 
 
To further test the effects of culture on trust-formation, the original user study, with some 
slight moderations and with a smaller user group, was again run in Iceland in 2000. Now, the 
cultural variation seemed even stronger and the trust-formation process appeared to be quite 
dissimilar from that of the Finns and Swedes. The outcomes of this user study are reported in 
detail in [P8]. [P9] represents an attempt to further analyse and categorize the findings by 
applying a semiotic analysis to the identified trust-building elements in the online 
environment, to understand the mechanisms behind their interpretation in online situations. 
 
On basis of the user interviews we also made a checklist of design qualities that could help to 
create trust in the user towards the service, even if providing design guidelines was not one of 
the initial goals of the work. The checklist was on rather high level of abstraction, but could 
still be used in the actual design of a user interface for a web-based service to ensure the users 
of the security of their transactions on that service – it could be used to guide the design 
intended to create trust. 
 
1.3 The structure of this work 
 
The structure of this work is as follows: first, there is an outline of the research questions and 
methods. Next, a cross-section of work done in the area of usablity of security is provided. 
The work then proceeds by presenting related work in the area of trust. The work continues 
with a summary of the main contributions of the thesis, originally presented in the 
publications that form the corpus of this thesis. The work ends with some concluding 
remarks, together with presenting some items for future work in trust research.  
 
2 Research questions and methods 
  
 
This section presents the research questions that motivated this work, together with the 
chosen methodology, with reasons behind choosing these methods. 
 
 
2.1  Research questions 
 
As already stated above, the work presented here can be seen as a continuation of the work 
conducted by Jarvenpaa et al, adopting a similar line of study especially in regard to the 
multi-cultural issues, as well as what comes to the chosen methodologies and setting of the 
research questions (Jarvenpaa et al 1999, 2000). These publications report on studying 
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consumers’ online trust behaviour in three different cultures: Australian, Israeli, and, later, 
Finnish. This ground-breaking study that was one of the first of its kind, showed how trust 
could be studied, what kind of hypotheses could be built and tested, and also that cultural 
factors clearly played a role even in a global environment that the Internet essentially is. 
 
Another study closely related to the study at hand is the relatively often-cited research report 
“Ecommerce Trust Study” (Cheskin 1999). In this work, the central research questions 
revolved around the definition, development, and the components of trust and trustworthiness, 
with a special focus on how these might be applied to ecommerce. The research reported here 
was outlined and started before the Ecommerce Trust Study appeared, which means it had no 
effect in the design of this study in the first phases. Further, the emphasis in this study was 
less on the commercial questions and more in understanding and analysing human behaviour 
in situations involving trust decisions from a usability point-of-view, and on what is the role 
of trust in both human-human and human-machine interactions in an ecommerce setting.  
 
The research at hand continued and complemented these research approaches by 
concentrating on finding answers to the following questions: 
 
1. Sources of trust 
 
- What are the sources of trust? Is it social networks (family, friends, colleagues), 
different mass media (television, radio, Internet, newspapers, magazines), or some 
other? 
- What is the relative importance of these various sources for trust forming? 
- In what kind of situations (email, ecommerce, online bank services) do users feel that 
trust is an issue? How do they express this? 
 
2. Definition of trust 
 
- What do users mean when they state they trust or distrust someone or something? 
- How can the implicit meanings of trust be made explicit? Can this be done? 
- Are there different levels of trust? If so, can these be defined somehow? 
 
3. How to express trust? 
 
- What ways of visualising trust would be acceptable and understandable for the users? 
- What would not be acceptable? 
- How much of trust management can be automated, and how much should be shown 
to the user? 
- In what format and how much information about security should the users be 
provided with? 
 
4. Finding the right technology 
 
- How can users’ expressions of trust be mapped with existing security technology, or, 
- Should a new set of security technologies be created “from scratch” that would better 
take into account the novel uses (e.g. ecommerce) and novel users (i.e., the 
technologically ignorant)? 
 
The research questions were chosen on basis of the previous work by Jarvenpaa et al as cited 
above, and also based on a literature survey performed before planning the user studies. 
Further, the needs discovered in the previous work in the research conducted in the area of 
computer security in the research projects at the same university, especially the work by 
Nikander (Nikander 1997, 1999) influenced the problem setting. The scope of the research 
was reformulated and updated against the gathered data, as well as on basis of the outcomes 
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of the Ecommerce Trust Study, in an iterative fashion, concentrating on issues that seemed 
most relevant in the light of the findings.  
 
 
2.2  Methods 
 
In the Ecommerce Trust Study, the research methodology included qualitative questionnaires, 
site review and analysis, expert opinions, and consumer opinions, neither of which was, 
however, conducted face-to-face (Cheskin 1999). As already mentioned, our studies were 
initially planned without knowledge of this study existing. In our studies, we wanted to try a 
different methodology than was used in Jarvenpaa et al (1999, 2000), since in their studies, 
also Finnish users had been involved so a different kind of approach would serve as 
complementary. We chose to use a more qualitative, or “soft”, approach, stemming from the 
HCI and ethnography: interviewing, observation of behaviour, and UCD and usability testing. 
These chosen methods are among standard means of gathering data about users inside HCI, so 
their selection is well grounded in that respect also. 
 
Choosing the right method for study depends to a great deal on the research questions and on 
the goal of the research (Landauer 1997). As the goal here was to enhance the current 
understanding a broad and ill-defined concept, such as trust essentially is, interacting with 
users face-to-face, interviewing and observing them seemed to be the approach that would 
most likely produce the kind of research data we needed. This point is further emphasised by 
the fact that trust was to take place in such a broad and equally ill-defined environment as the 
online environment is: Finding out what users actually mean when saying they trust 
something and how this trust might be expressed in practice in online situations, was likely 
not be to straight-forward. The choice of the methodology seems successful in that respect 
that some of the methods were similar to those of the Ecommerce Trust Study, providing a 
basis for comparison for the outcomes of the studies. Also later on, the research approach of 
B.J. Fogg and his group at Stanford (Fogg 2003), who also involved Finnish users in their 
study, became another complementary source for validating the results of our studies. This 
study used as main source of information online questionnaires, and is explained in more 
detail in later chapters. The emergence of studies with more or less the same research 
questions, but with a different set of methods, enabled comparison across the methodological 
theme of the work at hand: what kind of research approach would be most suitable for 
studying trust in the context of users’ interactions in the online environment?  
 
2.2.1  Semi-structured interviews 
 
Asking users directly on the topic is usually not a good idea, unless the aim of the research is 
to hear what the users consider as ideal behaviour under ideal circumstances (Keats 2000). 
Users tend to give “school class answers” to direct questions, describing schematized or ideal 
behaviour, instead of describing how they actually behave in real situations. This is why 
usage of questionnaires was discarded, especially since such research exists (e.g. Fogg et. al. 
2000 onwards). It is also quite hard to design a good questionnaire on such a topic as “trust” 
or “usable security”, with which so much remains not properly understood. Qualitative, semi-
structured interviews, on the other hand, seemed a good way to make users discuss such 
issues, since it allows for real-time reactions to the answers received, as well as for probing 
(Keats 2000, Kapaki et.al 1997). Further, since trust issues can be rather emotional and 
private by nature, the rapport built during the interviews would provide for depth in the 
answers and discussions that might not be possible to achieve through other methods (Keats 
2000, Landauer 1997), thus complementing and opening the results gained by using 
questionnaires for further analysis also.  
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Since most users are either not familiar with security issues and/or do not think of them in 
abstract terms but rather in relation to some experiences they have had in using applications 
or systems where security has become an issue, the interview structure was built around such 
areas that were thought to be familiar to the user. In this case, use of email, use of online bank 
services, and use of ecommerce are this kind of use areas that users were familiar with. There 
is a double idea hidden in this design: firstly, users are, in general, more interested in what 
they can achieve with new technology instead of being interested in the technology itself. 
People care for the goal, not for the means to get there (Adams and Sasse 1999b). The same 
goes for security: it is not an end in itself, but rather means to an end: a way to send and 
receive private email; to be able to find bargain prices for commodities in the Internet; to 
handle banking affairs safely from the home, and so on. This is why if we asked people 
directly, what they think of security, they might answer they don’t. However, users may, in 
fact have many ideas related to security that have arisen from previous usage of security-
critical systems. It is the researchers’ job to induce this level of analysis and find the right 
information from it (Landauer 1997).  
 
Secondly, people tend to be a bit of afraid of technology they do not understand, and 
computer security definitely belongs to this area. This is why people can easily feel that they 
do not know anything about security, and have no real experience of it. In fact, when looking 
for the non-technical, inexperienced users for our studies, we had a hard time convincing our 
users that it really was “ok” not to know anything about security and yet be part of the study. 
In general, users want to be successful in the studies; they want to perform well (Landauer 
1997). They are afraid they will look foolish, if they feel they do not have enough knowledge 
about the problem area under study. However, when users are asked about areas that are 
common to them, such as use of email, they tend to be happily surprised to find out that in 
fact they, in a way, do know about security, and more, they even have opinions about it. 
Therefore, a lot depends on how the questions are phrased and presented to the users, and the 
possibility for probing seems crucial to the relative success of this undertaking. In our case, it 
was often sufficient to convince a hesitating user to participate by asking: “Well, have you 
ever used email? Yes? That is enough!”, or, “No? Have you used Internet? Yes? That is 
enough!” 
 
The user interview basic structure is presented in more detail in the Appendix.  
 
2.2.2  Evaluating existing services 
 
Just talking about the matters in an interview is most likely not comprehensive enough, since, 
as is well known, users often say one thing and do another (e.g. Landauer 1997). To get the 
real picture of how users really might behave in situations where trust is in issue, it is better to 
put them in that situation and then have them act on it, rather than just discuss it in theory. 
Such a setting was accomplished by presenting users with a mock-up UI design for an online 
service (the first user study, group 1) or with existing Web services to go through (the second 
user study, group 2).  
 
After the interview section, on areas related to trust and security as described above, the users 
gained some tasks to perform with either the mock-up (groups 1) or the existing Web services 
(group 2), to find, identify and discuss the security features of the tested application or 
services. In the latter case, the users were also requested to evaluate the Web sites focusing on 
their apparent security.  
 
As the users went along conducting these tasks using the talk-aloud protocol (Nielsen 1993), 
the up-coming issues were discussed with the interviewer. After testing the application or 
services, the users were again interviewed, in the form of a semi-structured interview. Probing 
was used when users gave elusive answers or when users gave an answer that could be used 
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to lead the discussion to a deeper level. The interviews in all were taped with the users’ 
permission, to guarantee for exact recall to avoid subjective bias as far as possible.  
 
The basic structure for the evaluations is presented in the Appendix.  
 
2.2.3 User-centred UI design and usability testing 
 
User-centred design (UCD) starts with setting the user at the centre of attention and in control 
of that attention: UCD is based on the idea that the user knows what is best for him. Users are 
the best experts of their everyday life. This is true to the extent that the needs and the desires 
of the user must indeed be taken from the users, not invented by the designers and system 
builders, for example. On the other hand, it is not right to expect user to be clairvoyant about 
either his own unconsciousness nor about the future. It is not user’s responsibility to analyse 
the needs behind perceptible behaviour; nor be able to foresee new product ideas embedded in 
the lackings of the current situation and enabled by new technology and the minds of 
innovators – even if sometimes users can be quite innovative, too. Borrowing a felicitous 
example from (Karvonen and Parkkinen 2004) describes the setting in UCD quite well:  
 
“Asking the user what he would like is like asking him to describe ice. A person can usually 
describe the common properties of ice such as its temperature and moistness. Some people may 
portray the benefits or uses of ice, such as winter sports or cooling a drink. Few people are able 
to innovate new ways of utilising ice. However, when a designer comes up with a new and 
exciting idea such as using ice to cool feel on a hot summer day with special-made shoes with ice 
within, the idea and its benefits for the user must be measured before intitating mass production. 
This is the phase where UCD methods can provide the designer with tools to communicate with 
the future users of ice shoes. A designer living in a hot area may well come up with the idea of ice 
shoes, but a designer living in a chillier climate is likely not to be familiar with such a need as 
cooling one’s feet before getting to know the users of hotter climates.” 
 
Applying UCD means in practice that the user requirements are considered right from the 
beginning and included into the whole product cycle. The major characteristics in UCD are 
the active participation of real users, as well as an iteration of design solutions. This approach 
is manifest throughout the research via user interviews, as e.g. in [P1], user evaluations [P1], 
[P4] ,[P8], and usability testing [P6]. The usability framework is based on the International 
Organization for Standardization standard ISO 9241-11:1998, Ergonomic requirements for 
office work with visual display terminals (VDTs) – Part 11: Guidance on usability, where 
usability is defined as consisting of 
 
• Efficiency, 
• Effectiveness, and 
• Satisfaction. 
 
In all, usability, the usability of security, as described above, and UX and emotional HCI 
research provide the methodological and theoretical background of this work (e.g. Norman 
2004). 
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3 Background 
In this chapter, we will have a look at a cross-section of work done in the area of usability and 
security. 
 
3.1 Usability of security 
 
The goal in studying the makings of trust and usability of security in general, is to overcome 
the problems identified above so that in the future, the actual and the perceived security of, 
say, a web-based service, would be the same, and computer security would be seen as usable, 
understandable, maybe even enjoyable. In order for this to happen, a lot needs to be done. But 
how can we do this? How can we make such security more usable? The current low level of 
the usability of security can be said to stem from two different sources. Firstly, these systems 
and applications were designed for the technologically advanced, so their user-friendliness 
was not an issue: all the users knew the relevant terminology and what was going on behind 
the UI. This means that from the average man’s point of view the current UIs are still full of 
technical jargon, difficult to understand and to use, and not enough appropriate help is 
provided, even when the user population has greatly expanded and become more and more 
heterogeneous when it comes to the technological know-how the users possess. Secondly, 
there is a lack of interest, or motivation, for security: users are not interested in these systems 
as an end in itself, but only as means to some other goal. The current user population is not 
interested in the security behind the scenes, only in knowing that it’s there and what it 
enables. So, every task the users have to take to ensure their security is a pain. Any attempt to 
raise the level of usability of security should, then, take into account both of these affecting 
factors in order to succeed.  
 
Partly due to the common disinterest towards computer security, partly due to the inherent 
complexity of the area, an often suggested answer to the problem of low level of usability 
within computer security is to increase the automation level of security. In this scenario, 
security would be taken care of by the system on behalf of the user, and the user need not 
bother about it. However, for example in a now classical study on the usability of PGP 5.0, 
Whitten and Tygar (Whitten and Tygar 1998), state that even though automation may be the 
right solution for securing the communication channel itself, there remain situations where 
automation is not, and cannot, be the answer. At many points manual handling of the security 
features is required from the user, for example when giving access to shared files for others.  
 
Also, hiding security completely from the user is not a good idea for other reasons as well: if 
the security mechanisms are totally hidden, the users are not able to tell whether they are 
working or not, which would allow for successful attacks to remain undetected and make the 
system insecure (Jøsang et.al. 2001). Also, users have a need to be able to perceive that 
security is in fact taking place – they need some kind of feedback (Adams and Sasse 1999). 
Users also have a need to feel in control when using the system  – so full automation is not 
the answer they are looking for (Cheskin 1999, [P1], Nielsen 1999). Shneier states that 
security is easiest when it is visible to the user, when the user has to interact with the security 
and make decisions based on it: checking the name on a digital certificate, for example (even 
though making the concept of certificates understandable to the users may prove tricky, as we 
have experienced in [P6]). On the other hand, also Shneier is aware that users do not want to 
see security, they just want to know it is there (Shneier 2000).  
 
An important thing to emphasize is that people do want security, but they do not want to see it 
working. People are ready to compromise their security if it “gets in the way” - when 
something needs to be done quickly, they give up their security to get there. It is a trade-off 
between easy flow of action and having security. Once people want something badly enough, 
they forget about security precautions (Shneier 2000, [P1]. In a way, security can be easiest 
when it is visible to the user, when the user has to interact with the security and make 
 21
decisions about it. However, our studies have shown that users do not actually want to see 
security – it either frightens them or bores them [P1], [P3].  
 
Some information and evidence about security taking place should, then, be provided. 
However, it is essential that this information be presented in the right way to the user, that is, 
in a way understandable to the user. How to be successful in this is to use real users as 
evaluators of real and/or planned systems. A good example is easily found: In their evaluation 
study of PGP 5.0, a trust management system rather widely used and usually considered to be 
user-friendly, Whitten and Tygar found that the graphical user interface of the system was 
not, however, easily understandable to the users, and thus its functions were misunderstood 
and misinterpreted (Whitten and Tygar 1999).  
 
On basis of their research Whitten and Tygar claim that ordinary usability measures are not 
enough for ensuring the usability of security – the basic principles that had been used to try to 
make the design more user-friendly. Because of this, they set forth their own definition for it. 
This definition consists of rather general statements on how users should be made aware of 
the security tasks at hand, of how the users should be guided through the procedure, 
dangerous errors should be prevented, and the use should be made as comfortable as possible. 
These requirements seem rather commonplace for any usability expert, the only major 
difference to “ordinary usability” – in the sense of effectiveness, efficiency and user 
satisfaction (e.g. Nielsen 1993) – being in the irreversibility of error-making: if the system 
security is lost once due to an error, it may be lost forever. This is an important – and novel – 
point indeed.  
 
More interesting, however, is Whitten and Tygar's analysis of the problems typical of 
security. These include lack of motivation for security, the abstractness and alieness of 
computer security management systems for average users, lack of feedback, and, again, the 
importance of not making any mistakes – the use should be free from at least dangerous 
errors, or else the whole integrity of the system is at risk.   
 
In the usability study of the KaZaA P2P file-sharing system already described, replicating the 
methodology in Whitten and Tygar’s study came up with similar results (Good and 
Krekelberger 2003). In this study, Whitten and Tygar’s usability demands for computer 
security were slightly modified. Good and Krekelberger laid down four demands for Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) file sharing software to be safe and usable for its users. These demands were 
 
1. Users are clearly made aware of what files are being offered for others to download. 
2. Users are able to determine how to share and stop sharing files successfully. 
3. Users do not make dangerous errors that can lead to unintentionally sharing private 
files. 
4. Users are comfortable with what is being shared with others and confident that the 
system is handling this correctly. 
 
Even when these demands sound very basic, in the mentioned study the KaZaA system failed 
in all of them. According to (Zhang et al 2005), the distinguishing concept in P2P systems is 
sharing, by contributing to and benefiting from the Peer community (Schechter et al 2003) A 
fundamental problem in P2P systems is how to ensure and verify the authenticity and 
integrity of shared data or communicated information in open and highly distributed 
environments. Currently, most existing P2P applications do not have mechanisms to address 
these problems. From the usability point-of-view, the extent of sharing presents a further 
problem, as we have seen. 
 
Adams and Sasse (1999b) also give recommendations for creating usable security in their 
treatment on how to make passwords user-friendlier. Even if the emphasis in their work is in 
password usability, they also give recommendations on how to make computer security in 
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general more user-friendly. Motivating users, giving feedback and providing guidance come 
first on their list of design requirements as well. Further, Adams and Sasse also emphasise the 
importance of showing the users that security is taking place: “System security needs to be 
visible and seen to be taken seriously by the organisation” (Adams and Sasse 1999b).  
 
Adams and Sasse emphasise the organisation’s responsibility in creating an atmosphere where 
security is considered important and worthwhile. Better password usability is certainly crucial 
for increasing the usability of security, and this is, in fact, one of the areas of computer 
security where there exists some user studies already (e.g. Adams and Sasse 1999b, Dhamija 
2000, Bunnell et.al 1997, Brostoff and Sasse 2000). Also Sandhu (2003) makes good 
comments on this issue on organizational password policies being cumbersome and 
ungrounded. However, password usability falls out of the scope of this study.  
 
According to Shneier (2000) there are several features in handling security that make it 
special from other usage situations the user might come across. These include risks and 
exception handling. There are risks that people do not understand and whose impact they 
cannot estimate, nor predict when they might take place. Giving additional information to the 
users does not usually help, since this information is often too complicated, and even after 
understanding the information given, it may still be difficult to judge whether the risk is 
realised in the special case at hand or not. (About risks see also (Camp 2000)). 
 
On basis of these observations, Shneier has come up with a list of the six corner stones of the 
“human problem” in computer security: 
 
1) how people perceive risks 
2) how people deal with things that happen very rarely 
3) the problem of users trusting computers, and why that can be so dangerous 
4) the futility of asking people to make intelligent security decisions – they cannot always do 
so 
5) the dangers of malicious insiders, who are trusted implicitly 
6) social engineering, and why it is so easy for an attacker to simply ask for secret 
information, e.g. over the phone. 
 
On top of all these problems, a further complication with security is that it is about 
probabilities only; there is no absolute guarantee that security de facto happens. All security 
systems that are currently known are breakable – at least in principle. In most use cases where 
security is an issue, the most effective methods of securing the transactions taking place is not 
the heaviest method, since these take up a lot of processing time. In addition, the case where 
security is at risk is when a mistake occurs where there usually is no mistake. This means that 
since mistakes are “too” rare, people do not know how to deal with them. Usually things 
proceed “ok” – everything goes as planned. When an error occurs, it is unexpected, and users’ 
have no idea as of how to deal with the problem. It is very time-consuming to start looking for 
advice. People do not know where to find it, and even if they do find it, they do not always 
understand it, and often they are in a hurry and need to get things done. The usual trial-and-
error learning method so much in use with current information technology does not work with 
computer security, where even one mistake may be too much and end up in compromising the 
security for the whole system from then on. In this sense, at least, there seems to be a clear 
deviation from the standard usages of computer systems.  
 
This is related to the concept of “good-enough security”, the idea that perhaps it will not be 
needed to be able to guarantee absolute security, after all, but lesser means would be 
satisfactory – and safe – enough. Sandhu (Sandhu 2003) calls the “three golden principles” to 
guide information security the following: 
 
• Good enough is good enough. 
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• Good enough always beats perfect. 
• The really hard part is determining what is good enough. 
 
Referring to the words of Albert Einstein, “Everything should be made as simple as possible, 
but not simpler”, Sandhu suggest the following adaptation for the information security 
business: “Everything should be made as secure as necessary, but not securer.” He sees this as 
the essence of good-enough information security. While he acknowledges that there probably 
will be security fundamentalists who might question whether this is a reasonable quest, he 
clings to his claim. Sandhu refers to the networks currently in use that have good-enough 
security, namely the system of automatic teller machines (ATMs), where security is not 
absolute and still for the most, this is enough and users are usually comfortable using them. 
Since security goals have inner contradictions because confidentiality, integrity, privacy, 
accountability, and recovery often conflict fundamentally, according to Sandhu it makes no 
sense to strive to demand for perfect security, since it is probably not possible anyway – and 
the users are not asking for it, either. 
 
One more typical thing in usability of security is that even when the user knows what he or 
she wants, it is no easy task to transfer this goal to the computer so that it will do what the 
user wants it to do. The fundamental problem is that users have no idea what the computer is 
actually doing when they tell it to do something. This became painfully obvious in the 
aforementioned usability studies of PGP 5.0 and KaZaA as well: users were assuming their 
files were safe and emails encrypted, when in fact they were not. However, users do not, in 
general, have enough information nor skills to be able to judge the situation right, and if they 
want to go ahead with e.g. their file-sharing or emailing, they just hope and trust that the 
system is doing what they want it to do. A leap of faith is required from the user – trust is 
needed ([P3], Shneier 2000). 
 
People’s needs for security may also differ. For example, when it comes to privacy, Shneier 
states that people have a complicated relationship with privacy: When asked to pay for it, they 
often do not want to pay; they will rather do without – mainly because they may not 
understand how much is at risk. Cranor et al have stated that people can be categorised into 
different groups according to the level of privacy they need (Cranor et al 1999). However, 
people are not always aware that there is something to lose when giving away their privacy. 
Shneier goes as far as to claim that almost no-one realises exactly how important privacy is in 
his or her life – before it is gone (Shneier 2000).  
 
Another thing affecting the usability of security is anonymity. In most cases, when we are 
making transactions online, taking part in chat and news conversations, we may be identified 
by others. There are two schools of thought about this: those in favour of strong 
authentication, where users are always identified, and those in favour of anonymous 
authentication, where users are only identified to have a right to a certain service, but not 
identified as who they really are. However, do we need anonymity? Is it a good thing or not? 
How do users feel about it? This is a question that is clearly related to the privacy 
categorization by Cranor et al, and it is likely that here people’s preferences will vary. 
However, in certain situations people might differ not so much at all: e.g. Social anonymity 
(e.g. help lines), as well as political anonymity certainly seem to be needed also in the future, 
both in networks as in real life (Fukuyama 1996, [P3], Shneier 2000).  
 
However, providing means for anonymity online may have its side effects: people are already 
using the anonymity on the Internet to also send threatening email, publish hate speech, 
disperse computer viruses, and so on (Shneier 2000). Authentication is needed on some level: 
it is about the continuity of relationships, knowing who to trust and who not to trust, making 
sense of a complex world. If there is no way to authenticate the service provider, how does 
the customer know whether to trust the service provider? Which of the merchants are honest, 
and which are scams? The Web-site name may be well-known outside the Web, but is it 
 24
really the same merchant (Shneier 2000)? These questions are related to the problems of 
identity management, where there remain many unresolved usability issues, as well as an 
important threat for trust creation, namely identity theft. Identity management, however, falls 
out of the scope of this study, though its relevance is immense (c.f. Camp 2004 for a good 
presentation on the topic of digital identities).   
 
According to Shneier, this is the most difficult problem to solve: authentication across digital 
networks. There are going to be as many different solutions as there are different 
requirements. Some solutions are going to have to be robust, protecting values in the millions 
of dollars. Some do not have to be so strong: authentication for a merchant's discount card, for 
example, and so on. Which of these does the user need to be able to use and understand, and 
which will be acceptable for which user? These questions urgently need answers. A further 
problem with authentication from the control point of view is that often computer 
authentication is, in fact, invisible to the user. For example, when a mobile phone is used, it 
authenticates itself to the network so the network knows whom to charge for the calls. This 
authentication might be unwanted – at least as strong authentication, e.g. the user might not 
wish to leave traces of his or her movements on the network.  
 
It has also been argued that the real problem is not at all in finding reliable encryption and 
authentication methods, for these exist already: the problem would then not be in the secure 
technological infrastructure, but more so in creating enough trust in users towards these 
systems and thus increasing their willingness to indulge in the transactions over the Internet 
via reducing the amount of perceived risk involved in such transactions (e.g. Salam et al 
2003). This could be achieved through various means, such as using TTPs as intermediaries, 
for example. 
 
However, from a user’s point-of-view, authentication is just one question among many. A 
further problem with usability of security is to define the right level of information provided. 
In the case of trust, it seems we have two options: either we can hide the security features 
from the users as fully as possible, or we must make them understandable from the user's 
point-of-view. As we have seen, full automation is probably not the best possible approach to 
induce trust. A mixture of hiding and revealing information about the security, along with 
preventing the user from making any serious mistakes, is a likely solution. It would also be 
worthwhile to see if it would be possible to vary these features according to the amount of use 
experience the user has, by providing less choice for novice users, and more flexibility for 
experienced users, as their trust requirements are likely to be different: experienced users with 
an understanding of the technical features of security will want to have access to that 
information in order to be able to trust the service built on that technology, whereas novice 
users will shy away from instructions that appear to be too technical and avoid overflows of 
such information. Knowing the users and which user group they belong to, is key in being 
able to create a successful mixture of hide-and-reveal approach to visualising computer 
security on a user interface level.  
 
One more thing to consider is that some of our “users” who need to trust others may actually 
not be human users, but might be other computer programs, servers or companies. However, 
the use situation remains the same, so it may be a good decision to hide this variety of users 
from the novice and intermediate users, at least to avoid confusion. From the user point of 
view there is no real difference in the operations, whether performed by another human user 
or by a machine granting or revoking the rights, so there should not be a difference on user 
interface level either. 
 
What we have seen is that “usability of security” might indeed be somewhat different from 
“ordinary usability”. The major difference seems to lie in the risks entailed in computer 
security – error-making has much more powerful repercussions in security than in most other 
computer-related areas involving users and/or user interface design. Complete avoidance of 
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user-made errors is a novel demand introduced by usability of security, and it is likely to be a 
hard nut to crack. In other appliances, like surfing on the Net with a graphical browser or 
using a word processor, a trial-and-error method is how the rules and logic of these systems 
are learned. Making mistakes might be frustrating, and time-consuming, but it does usually 
not create any major risk. With computer security, however, the situation is altogether 
different, as we have already stated.  It is a good question, then, how we are going to deal 
with this high demand on error-freedom. Since most graphical user interfaces the users are 
currently familiar with allow making mistakes, it might be a good idea to base the design of 
security user interfaces on a completely different UI design principles, and try to avoid any 
similarities. As surprising as this suggestion may seem, it might in fact be the only way to 
stop users from learning the use of the security UI through the trial-and-error procedure they 
are used to revert to with the introduction of other applications used with the same device. 
The downside of this approach is, of course, in that it requires an extensive amount of 
learning effort from the users, not to mention motivation – which we have already seem to be 
low in matters of security (Adams and Sasse 1999b). What seems to be certain is that one 
ingredient in making computer security more usable and what such user interfaces should 
achieve is enhancing the system’s capabilities of appearing trustworthy, and the way it can 
enable users to express their trust in a way that seems natural to these users. 
 
It is characteristic of usability of security research that it is still rather scarce, though its 
importance is recognised and acknowledged. Recently, more and more work has however 
started appearing in this field, including some summaries on this work (e.g. Cranor and 
Garfinkel 2005, Riegelsberger et al 2003, Camp 2001, Araujo and Araujo 2003, and Ellison 
2002, Dourish et al 2004, and Grinter et al 2005 on security issues at homes, etc.).  
 
4 Related Work 
 
In this section, we will provide a representative sample of various types of trust studies that 
exist, starting with various ways how trust can be defined, and phrasing our own definition for 
trust. This is followed by presentation of a selection of ways trust has been studied, divided 
into subchapters. The treatise of trust research is by no means intended as exhaustive, since 
this would in practice be impossible – its aim is to cover the classical studies in this area, but 
also to show, via selected examples, the great variety of approaches in existence in trust 
research. 
 
4.1 On the concept of trust 
 
It is difficult to think of a research topic more intriguing and difficult than “trust” essentially 
is. It has been studied from each and every angle: in the philosophical, sociological, 
psychological, computer scientific, economic, and legal sense – just to name a few. Alas, not 
many firm and unifying results have been reached so far, and not much uniformity in how to 
define the concept of trust, in the first place, has emerged. This is regrettable, for trust is 
nonetheless seen as one of the very bases of online interactions, and further, the very basis of 
our society.  
 
The very meaning of the term trust is itself problematic and often unscrutinised, and there are 
many alternative definitions of the word. Again, the Thesaurus provides a partial answer: with 
trust, we can mean, among other things, “complete assurance and certitude regarding the 
character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something“. As synonyms for trust, we get 
a list including concepts such as confidence, dependence, faith, hope, and reliance. We also 
get a list of related words – these have something to do with the notion of trust. The list is 
made up of assurance, certainty, certitude, conviction; belief, credence, credit; positiveness, 
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sureness; entrustment; overconfidence, and oversureness (http://www.m-
w.com/dictionary.htm). 
 
Even if the Thesaurus gives us some understanding, it is by far not enough. Trust is a complex 
phenomenon that has up-to-date not been analysed properly either in philosophical, 
sociological or technical sense of the word. Trust has sometimes been defined as something 
that “begins where prediction ends” (Lewis and Weigert 1985b) and is often considered to be 
little more than an individual psychological state that has more to do with a specific 
individual and her psychological and sociological make-up than with some real-life state of 
affairs (Lewis and Weigert 1985a).  
 
Sociologically, trust could be defined as a sort of a “header” that describes the nature of 
transactions between two or more individuals, an individual and an institution or an authority, 
or between two institutions, to put it in a simple way (Giddens 1989) – interactions happen in 
a trusting atmosphere. A sociological study of trust would concentrate more on the distinction 
between trust in people and trust in “abstract systems”, and interpersonal trust is built upon 
mutual involvement and in the faith in the integrity of the other person. Trust in the abstract 
systems, however, is the basis for feeling of day-to-day security that in its turn forms the basis 
for social life (Giddens 1989). This trust in “abstract systems”, or, a trust in an impersonal, 
anonymous someone seems to carry some similarity as compared to the current situation of 
trust in anonymous service-provider on the Web – an abstract system from the user’s point-
of-view.  
 
Trust can be also viewed as a historically emergent property of human interaction that is tied 
to a specific form of social organisation (Lewis and Weigert 1985b). Modern forms of trust 
are, then, rooted in the rights, obligations, and liberties of citizenship (Lewis and Weigert 
1985a, Fukuyama 1995, Luhmann 1979, Seligman 1997, Loukola 1999). 
 
Philosophically, trust is to be separated from confidence and faith – both concepts with which 
the concept of trust seems to be at least partially overlapping (Seligman 1997). Trust is related 
to all these concepts and must be set in context with them. However, a further philosophical 
analysis of the notion of trust falls, again, out of the scope of this study, even if trust has 
traditionally been dealt more by philosophers than social scientists. Among the latter, trust has 
been explored mostly by social choice theorists (more specifically, usually through the 
development of Prisoner’s Dilemma games, (e.g. Loukola 1999)) and as large-scale surveys 
on existing literature on “trust” in local and national governments, NATO, the UN, etc 
(Seligman 1997). It soon becomes obvious that the use of the term trust tends to be loose and 
imprecise as it ranges from micro to macro encounters and is used to express ideas akin to 
Durkheim's solidarity on the one hand and simple confidence in the iteration of interaction on 
the other, and everything in-between: trust is hard to pin down to an unambiguous definition. 
 
This variety for the meanings of trust we have just witnessed should come as no surprise, for 
one already can intuitively feel that the “trust” existing, say, between members of a relatively 
undifferentiated, tribal society may be of a very different order than that bestowed (or 
withheld) among modern, contracting, market-oriented individuals, citizens of nation-states. 
Among these latter, the obligation to be trustworthy, and so to fulfil promises, arises from the 
moral agency and autonomy, from the freedom and responsibility, of the participants to the 
interaction (e.g. Fukuyama 1995). Moreover, without the prior existence of these conditions, 
rights really – rights to freedom, autonomy, and responsibility, the moral dimension of 
promise-keeping, and hence of trustworthiness – cannot be adequately explained (Seligman 
1997). In fact, the structure of our civil society as it now appears to us, is based on such 
various trust relationships and expectations (Fukuyama 1995). Indeed, the existence of trust is 
an essential component of all enduring social relationship: power, dominance, and coercion 
can be a temporary solution to the problem of social order, but they will not provide the basis 
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for a permanent solution, or maintenance of said order over time – only social trust can do 
this (Seligman 1997).  
 
The same goes for the “online order” – the same rules of human order and existence apply. 
Real-world trust seems to be transferable to the digital world: Trusting a bank stays more or 
less the same regardless of the media (e.g. Ecommerce Trust Study 1999) (there are, however, 
also some reports on studies that disagree on this point, e.g., Hoffman et al 1999). More 
important than the place where the service is situated seems to be the existing brand 
reputation and other users’ opinions about the service provider. These elements create the 
sense of place that guides the social interactions, perception of privacy, and the nature of all 
transactions conducted online (Adams and Sasse 1999b). 
 
In brief, it can be said that while some form of trust - or more properly confidence - among 
social actors is necessary for the continued operation of any social order, the issue of trust as a 
solution to a particular type of risk is, according to Seligman, a decidedly modern 
phenomenon, linked to the division of labour in modern, market economies (Seligman 1997) 
– a solution that should now find ways to transform into online trust as well.  
 
Further, trust, as both a solution to and an articulation of a specific interactional problem, is 
tied to a particular idea of the self that we identify, most broadly, with modern social 
formations (Seligman 1997). On the most general and abstract level it can be stated that the 
need for persistent, stable, and universally recognised structures of trust is rooted in the 
fundamental indeterminacy of social interaction. This indeterminacy lies between: 
 
• social actors, 
• social actors and their goals and 
• social actors and results.  
 
Furthermore, this indeterminacy results in a basic unpredictability in social life 
notwithstanding the universality of human interdependence. So, any social structures intended 
to have any permanence over time must be based on developing mutual trust between social 
actors: trust enables them, sustains them and enhances them (Seligman 1997).  
 
The emphasis in modern societies on consensus, the ideology of pragmatism, problem-
solving, and technocratic expertise, as well as conflict management, are all founded on an 
image of society based on interconnected networks of trust – among citizens, families, 
voluntary organisations, religious denominations, civic associations, and the like. Similarly 
the very “legitimisation” of modern societies is founded on the “trust” of authority and of 
governments as generalisations of trust on the primary, interpersonal level. Also, the 
definitions of trust in Western industrialised and “modern” societies are rooted in the idea of 
the individual as final repository of rights and values (Seligman 1997). 
 
From a cognitive point-of-view, trust seems to imply lack of sufficient amount of knowledge 
(Adams and Sasse 1999b, Safer Internet 2006, Cardholm 1999), meaning that there is at least 
some amount of uncertainty involved (Jøsang 1998, Jøsang 1999, Mühlfelder et al 1999). 
What this means from the user’s perspective, must be studied further. Furthermore, trusting 
reduces the complexity of a situation (Olson and Olson 2000, Seligman 1997). When we 
decide to trust rather than suspect — there is a leap of trust — the number of issues we have 
to consider is reduced, thereby simplifying the process of making decisions. How such 
trusting decisions are made and what they are based on is one issue for further studies. 
Trusting also describes an attitude towards future expectations, as well as introduces the 
presence of implied risk in a given situation (Mühlfelder et al 1999). How these attitudes are 
formed is one more relevant area for trust research. 
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We have discussed on how trust is a notion that frequently comes up in any conversation 
about creating more usable computer security design (e.g. Anderson 2001). However, what do 
we mean by security in this context, and how are the concepts of security and trust 
interrelated? A Thesaurus tells us that security is linked with such concepts as “safe”, 
“reliable”, “stable”, “sure” or “riskless”. Looking at security from a more technical point of 
view, security seems to be made up of the ingredients of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (White et al 1996). Confidentiality here means privacy: the information 
transmitted between two systems is revealed only to authorised individuals. Integrity, on the 
other hand, is protection of transmitted data from being transformed in any way. The meaning 
of availability is intuitive: it means that the data is available to authorised users whenever they 
need it (Holmström 1999, Anderson 2001). 
 
Trust is related to such neighbouring concepts in computer security as confidentiality, 
secrecy, and privacy. On basis of (Anderson 2001) these terms may be further shortly defined 
(from a technical point-of-view) as follows: 
 
• Secrecy is a technical term that refers to the effect of the mechanisms used to limit the 
number of actors who can access the information at hand. Such mechanisms include 
use of cryptography and/or computer access controls.  
• Confidentiality involves an obligation to protect some other person’s or 
organisation’s secrets. It is like a ‘promise given’ not to disclose such information to 
others. 
• Privacy is the ability and/or right to protect one’s personal secrets. It extends to the 
ability and/or right to prevent invasions of one’s personal space. 
 
In order for any system to be trustworthy, then, it must include all of these, and to be able to 
maintain them. In order for the system to be perceived as trustworthy from the user-point-of-
view, it must also communicate these different sides of its technical trustworthiness to the 
user in an understandable way. 
 
In the context of humans and technology that we are now in, we need to define trust from a 
technical point-of-view as well as from a human point-of-view. In the human dimension, the 
definition of trust is still seeking its formulation as we have just seen, but from the technical 
side things are a lot easier – we have some basic definitions available. This section is to a 
great extent based on [P3], where it is presented in more detail.  
 
To begin with, in the technical sense a distinction can be made between two basic meanings 
of trust as an overall characterisation of the whole system. In computer security literature in 
general, the term is used to denote that something (i.e. a computer system) must be trusted 
(e.g. Trusted Computing Base, TCB). That is, something trusted is something that the users 
are necessarily dependent on. If a trusted component breaks, the security of all of the system 
breaks. There is no decision of trust to be made, the user necessarily “trusts” the system if 
he/she uses it in the first place. Further, a separation between trusted and trustworthiness is 
made (e.g. Anderson 2001). A system can be (erroneously) trusted, when in fact it is 
untrustworthy and can fail. However, trustworthiness means that the system really is 
trustworthy and can be trusted: it won’t fail (Anderson 2003).  So, in the technical world, 
trusted refers to the actual behaviour and attitudes of users, and does not tell us everything (if, 
indeed, anything) about the actual system, whereas trustworthiness refers to the system’s 
attributes, and states the true state of its security. On the other hand, in more psychologically 
oriented literature, the terms trust and trustworthy are used to denote that something can be 
trusted. That is, something trusted is something that the users feel comfortable with to be 
dependent on (e.g. Nielsen 1999a). If a trusted component breaks, the users feel betrayed. 
(Probably some harm is done to the security of the system as well, but that is less relevant to 
this discussion.) This distinction should be kept in mind. 
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Trust, as a technical expression, is about whether a subject (program or person) is allowed (or 
trusted) to perform a specific action on some object. The question could range from e.g. if 
user Alice1 is allowed to read file.doc, to if we can trust a piece of downloaded software to run 
on our computer (possibly under certain conditions). There has been already a number of 
various techniques that attempt to express real life trust in various kinds of digital format. 
Trust management, as a component of security in network services, refers to management of 
security policies, security credentials and trust relationships (Blaze et. al. 1996, 1999). A 
security policy is a formal representation of the allowed (and forbidden) actions in the system. 
A typical example would be a policy on access control, stating e.g. that subjects with certain 
credentials are allowed to access some specified objects. More generally, a security policy is a 
formal specification of authorisation. Credentials are statements concerning a subject made by 
some speaker, often expressed in the form of certificates, that is, electronically signed 
documents. A typical credential would be (a certificate stating that) “this public key belongs 
to Alice”. From a user point of view, the trust management level is the security abstraction 
level that is of interest. Trust management is relevant, when we want to make educated 
decisions about who to trust, as well as when we make policy decisions concerning, for 
example, what applications we trust to run on our computer. 
 
In order to clarify things on how trust management in practice works, two different, currently 
existent approaches to the trust management problem: PGP (see e.g. PGP Users Guide, 
http://www.pgpi.org/doc/pgpintro/) and PolicyMaker (Blaze et. al. 1996)) were presented and 
compared in [P3] and [P5]. Both of these also have their own application areas: PGP is 
intended for providing keys for secure email, while PolicyMaker is a more general framework 
for trust management.  
 
Both trust management systems presented solve some of the overall trust management 
problems, but they still have their limitations. PGP is relatively rigid and bound to a single 
application. Even if it is based on a relatively intuitive trust model, it still has considerable 
usability problems, and is not intuitive to many users (Whitten and Tygar 1999). PolicyMaker 
on the other hand solves the problem of being a generic mechanism, but it is clearly intended 
for the application developer, not the end user [P5]. Also, PolicyMaker leaves it to the 
application developer to decide how to express trust, which means it is very unlikely that 
different applications will be interoperable or understand the same policy. (KeyNote provides 
some improvement on this issue). 
 
However, as has been argued in (Nikander 1999), these systems can and should be, extended 
to handle also other forms of trusted information. That is, even the expressions of 
authorisation information may be considered as a form of trust expressions, and the same 
kinds of certificates can be used to express many other forms of trust. Thus, it can be 
proposed that some form of authorisation certificates, or rather trust certificates, could be 
used for expressing trust decisions and recommendations made by the users [P3]. The 
certificate-based solution is presented more in detail in [P3]. The problems of revoking such 
certificates, as well as many practical issues with using certificates remain still greatly 
unresolved. These problems were touched briefly in (Karvonen et al 2001).  
 
Given this kind of arrangement, users could also express their opinions about specific brands 
by referring to the public keys of those brand names [P3]. Already as such, these kinds of 
techniques could be used to create digital counterparts of our real life social networks, and to 
express our opinions in a digital format.  
 
                                                     
1 Alice, Bob, etc. are regular pseudonyms for parties in security protocols. Even if person names are 
always used, this does not mean that the parties involved are always human – they may be either 
humans or machines. 
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The purpose of the explicit utterance of trust, in the form of certificates, is to promote a 
climate of trust, where interactions are based on trusted communication lines and parties, and 
to create a secure sense of place, allowing the users to conduct their tasks with a feeling of 
security that is based on real security measures [P3] As discussed, essential elements in these 
are good-quality relationships, explicit brand reputation, and other users’ opinions about 
service provides, among other things. All of these, along with basic recommendations and 
expressions of trust, can be represented in the form of digitally signed documents, i.e., 
certificates. 
 
In order to be useful, the handling of these kinds of trust expressions should be integrated to 
the trusted computing base (TCB) of the used computing system. That is, the security 
mechanisms of the underlying operating system should be extended to understand where, 
when, and for what purpose trust is needed when conducting transactions over the network. In 
practice, this means that the operating system takes responsibility for securing the network 
connections, and whenever running an authentication protocol in order to open a new 
connection, takes care of evaluating the trust requirements of the requesting application, 
together with the credentials of the server and client programs. In [P3] it was described, how 
this could be realised multi-user operating system running TCP/IP protocol stack and using 
the IPsec security protocols. The security policy would be based on the trust expressions the 
user has stated earlier, augmented with online user interaction when needed. On opened 
connections, the trust assumptions and credentials were suggested to be separately bound to 
each IPsec security association (SA), allowing SA sharing whenever the needs of a new 
connection match with ones provided by an existing SA (Nikander 1999). As another 
example, we considered how Java/Jini based ad hoc communities could be secured with SPKI 
certificates, and how simple application specific trust relationships could be represented in 
that kind of information (Eronen et al 2000).  
 
Bertino et al approach the issues from the knowledge management point-of-view, with a good 
presentation of the overall state of work in this area (Bertino et al 2006). They present the 
trust negotiation (TN) approach, which is exploiting the concept of properties of the entities 
as a means for establishing trust, particularly in open environments such as the web, where 
interacting entities are usually unknown to each other. TN is a P2P interaction, and consists of 
the iterative disclosure of digital credentials, representing statements certified by given 
entities, for verifying properties of their holders in order to establish mutual trust. In such an 
approach, access to resources (data and/or services) is possible only after a successful TN is 
completed. A TN system typically exploits digital identity information for the purpose of 
providing a fine-grained access control to protected resources. However, unlike conventional 
access-control models, TN assumes that the interacting parties are peers and that each peer 
needs to be adequately protected. For instance, with respect to the peer owning the resource to 
be accessed, assets that need to protected are, in addition to the resource, the access-control 
policies, as they may contain sensitive information, and the credentials of the resource owner. 
With respect to the peer requiring access to the resource, the assets to be protected are the 
credentials as they often contain private information about the individual on behalf of whom 
the peer is negotiating (Bertino et al 2006). How to communicate the relative success of 
failure of the TN to the user, and finding out what else the peer might consider private, and 
how to show that the privacy is being preserved, are some examples of the “human problems” 
in the TN approach.  
 
These are by no means the only solutions, but they represent different approaches to the 
problem. One area still requiring considerably more study is the relationship of these kinds of 
security measures, enforced by the operating system, and the user interface. It seems that 
something similar to the trusted path is needed. Other related areas include database seucrity, 
security for GIS (Geographic Information System) data, an increasingly important area for 
national security, for information-grid architectures and for sensor data as well as privacy and 
security for Web services and the semantic Web (Bertino and Sandhu 2005).  
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To be able to bring together the different worlds of technical trust and real-world trust 
expressed by users, we should look for a mechanism that will 
  
• express trust in a digital form and 
• write a policy that uses this digital expression of trust 
• in such a way that is technically secure and understandable by the users. 
 
The key question is how to deal with the complexity that security inevitably holds within. 
Decisions about security, or trust, are not by their nature simple. How could we guarantee that 
users could, at the same time, make a simple yet accurate decision about trust? Will existing 
technical solutions be appropriate enough to provide means to map these novel user needs, or 
should we, after finding out the real user needs try to build something completely new? 
Furthermore, would this be based on some kind of a general model of trust, or are we more 
likely to experience a multitude of application specific trust management systems?  
 
From the user’s point of view, the problem areas include the following: 
 
• How to separate trustworthy and untrustworthy services from each other? 
• How can a service provider let users know that it is trustworthy? 
• How can users get information about security and trust issues in a form that is 
understandable to them? What kind of information do they need and want? 
• How can users manage their security needs in a way that is both usable and 
meaningful? 
• How can we motivate the users to care about their security in a positive way, and not 
to consider it as a burden? 
 
On the other hand, even if the human can in fact be pointed out as the ’weakest link’, also the 
computer systems are not infallible. Diomidis D. Spinellis gives a nice handling to this well-
known dilemma. According to him, even if some users, especially the ’average man’ often 
treats computers as ’godlike’ and this also reflects the current refrain of computers as the most 
ingenious invention of the king of the creation, the humans, we are, in the end, aware that the 
system we like to see as omnipotent can ultimately fail: The system is breakable (Spinellis 
2003). Spinellis also uses the metaphor of the ’weakest link’. According to him, it will not be 
enough that the apparatus is secure and its operation system a closed one; also the programs 
that it is running need to be complete and carefully written security-wise. For the security of 
computer security to actually happen, Spinellis states that the current systems tend to become 
too large, complex, and elaborate to run to be effective and usable. A central solution in this 
area is an unlikely solution according to Spinellis.  
 
This issue is related to the often poorly handled difference between trustworthiness and being 
trusted, according to Ross Anderson (Anderson 2003). Anderson claims that trustworthiness 
is a stronger term: it denotes the idea of being unbreakable. The trust provided by this system 
will not be broken.  Instead, trusted can mean almost anything – anyone can decide to trust 
anything on any grounds. The term trusted only states that trust is taking place. This 
fundamental difference between the two terms and their meaning must be kept in mind when 
researching the contents of trust situation currently under investigation, and trustworthiness 
of, say, an online situation, should not be falsely promoted among trusting users, if there 
really are not good grounds to do so. The alleged trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of any 
online service must be clearly and unanimously visible to the user, who must be able to make 
correct decision about whether it is wise to trust or distrust the service or system at hand. 
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4.1.1 On privacy 
 
Trust is closely related, and in fact intertwined with the notion of privacy, and sometimes it is 
hard to tell the two apart – they are clearly interdependent. In practical research, however, 
there exist two separate lines of research, one on privacy, and one on trust. This is why the 
topic of privacy is only shortly touched on here, and to limit the scope of study covered.  
However, in any treatise on trust, something must be said about privacy as well. Let us 
concentrate on privacy online. 
 
Considering an online service trustworthy means, among other things, considering the 
information provided for the service and all the conducted transactions to remain private (e.g. 
Anderson 2001). This, then, means that the information will not be available to others, and 
will not be used out of context, for example. Privacy is indeed one of the top priorities of 
consumers intending to use Internet-based services, and it seems to be ahead of such qualities 
as ease-of-use or cost (e.g. BusinessWeek/Harris Poll (1998) and (2000)). The use of Internet 
is threatening consumer privacy in new and extreme ways, and people are willing to take the 
time and effort to make sure that their privacy on the Net is being protected (Hoffman 
et.al.1999). In a constant disappointment with the continuing current privacy-violating 
practices of the actors of the online environment, the voice of the general public tries to be 
heard via public interest activities such as Electronic Privacy Information Center, EPIC 
(www.epic.org). EPIC is a public interest research centre based in Washington, D.C. It was 
established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and to protect 
privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values. EPIC has published annual and 
several separate reports on the current (poor) state of privacy online (e.g. EPIC 2005). Figure 
1 presents a list of some of the demands for ensuring privacy presented by the organisation.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Epic’s list of fair information practices. (Epic 2005) 
 
In order to protect users’ privacy, we need to know its scope and limits. But defining privacy 
is not an easy task. Privacy is a basic human requirement we have a fundamental right to, but 
this does not reduce its ambiguity. What is regarded as private varies across organisations, 
 33
cultures and even individuals (Adams and Sasse 1999b). Another look in a Thesaurus tells us 
that privacy is “the quality or state of being apart from company or observation, that is, 
seclusion” (1 a), or “freedom from unauthorised intrusion, one's right to privacy” (1 b). In the 
archaic sense, privacy can also mean “a place of seclusion” (2). The third and last meaning 
given us by the Thesaurus links privacy with security through secrecy, depicting privacy as 
“secrecy” (3 a), or as “a private matter, secret” (3 b). A traditional way to look at privacy is to 
focus on the defensive role privacy can play in limiting others from access: either from access 
to oneself or to information about oneself (Taviani 1996).  
 
If we concentrate on the case of online transactions, we can state that privacy includes both 
the privacy of personal information supplied by the user for the service-provider as well as 
privacy of any transactions (that involve the use of money) performed by the user online in 
the Internet.  In a study done at AT&T Labs-Research (Cranor et al 1999), a questionnaire on 
users’ attitudes about online privacy, it was found that the general attitudes of the users varied 
greatly, when it came to the question of what is considered to be private. The users were 
loosely grouped into three categories in their attitudes towards privacy. These were: 
  
• The privacy fundamentalists, who were extremely concerned about their privacy,  
• The pragmatists, who were also concerned about their privacy but were ready to 
trust the services if there was some sign of existing privacy protection, and  
• The marginally concerned, who were willing to give data to web sites under almost 
any conditions.  
 
The implications of this study suggest that one of the major issues in implementing any 
privacy protocols will be designing suitable UIs for them. On basis of the analysis of the 
completed questionnaires the researchers were able to draw some general guidelines for the 
design of secure UIs:  
 
• such systems must inform the user when privacy might be at risk and 
• this must be accomplished in a seamless and unobtrusive way  
• very simple interfaces are likely to be useful and usable for both users with strong 
feelings about privacy and users with very little concerns about privacy issues. 
However, the “pragmatists” may need a different approach in UI design best suited 
for them. 
 
Among the most important findings was the conclusion that it seemed unlikely that there 
could be a “one-size-fits-all” approach to online privacy that would be successful. The users 
were too heterogeneous a group in their opinions, assumptions and the amount of appropriate 
knowledge for this to be possible. It is also likely that there will be not just individual 
differences but also cultural ones what comes to the makings of privacy: The need for privacy 
and the requirements for experiencing when the standards for privacy are being met is likely 
to vary culturally as well. 
 
The part privacy plays in trust can be demonstrated via the analysis by Good and Krekelberg 
on the usability of KaZaA file sharing application (Good and Krekelberg 2003). The work is 
based on (Whitten 1999) and deals with the usability issues in file-sharing over network. Even 
the topic of the paper is not really trust, from this work can nicely be used to show how 
privacy of the user can be shattered by bad usability, leading to the disappearance of trust the 
user was originally feeling toward the system. In the case of using  KaZaA, trust is primarily 
lost due to the fact that the control is taken away from user, who has little means to gain 
understanding on what consequences the choices have on the level of sharing.  
 
KaZaA is primarily intended for sharing multimedia files across users via network, but it can 
also be used for sharing other types of data between the users.  One objective of the research 
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was to investigate, how understandable are the current file-sharing procedures of KaZaA. The 
researchers had noticed that it is likely that users end up sharing more files than they have 
intended. In addition, they were likely accidentally to share information that was private in 
nature and that they did not really wish to share. KaZaA represents a model example of an 
application that was originally intended only to be used by experts, but which has later been 
spread to a much wider and more heterogeneous user base. This is a typical background in 
area of trust, and explains to some extent why the usability problems can be so huge. Maybe 
the biggest problem is that users are treated as if they were experienced network 
administrators, giving them rights to conduct changes the consequences of which they have 
no way to understand, nor handle. In KaZaA, for example, it is possible share user’s Inbox or 
personal diary with the rest of the network, without user even noticing that this has happened.  
 
Giving too much rights, and too little information is a dangerous combination only too 
typical. In practice, the security of the system used has been made the responsibility of the 
non-suspecting user. The outcome of this setting often is that user is compromising his 
security without knowing. A basic requirement in good usability in the area of security is that 
such mistakes should not be possible, and the responsibility is not left to the user alone. The 
system should be ‘wiser’ than the user, preventing dangerous errors from the user (e.g. 
Riegelsberger 2003, Adams and Sasse 1999). Motivation for caring about privacy can also be 
provided by personalised privacy tools that enhance trust; at present, a user with particular 
privacy needs and policy often lacks the means to fulfil them (Lau et. al. 1999), (Rocco 
1998), (Ackerman et al 2005). Users interested in their privacy often have to also conclude 
that the privacy information on most sites is confusing, incomplete, and inconsistent (Surfer 
Beware III 1999), (Yee 2005), even if the users would show an interest towards this kind of 
information. Privacy has also often been balanced against other, competing interests, both 
personal and others' (Clarke 1999), (Yee 2005), (Ackerman et al 2005). 
 
However, studying privacy more in depth is well covered elsewhere (e.g. Wang et.al 1998, 
Pedersen 1997, Kelvin 1973, Adams and Sasse 1999, Clarke 1999, Camp 2003, 
Camp&Osorio 2003, Ackerman et al 2005, Yee 2005, Cranor et al 2006; see also the P3P 
project (www.w3.org/P3P/)), and falls out of the scope of this study. However, it should be 
kept in mind that when trying to come up with trust-enhancing solutions and an understanding 
of trust, there also has to an understanding on the privacy issues at hand as well. Furthermore, 
on the UI level, many of the same principles may apply when dealing with either privacy or 
trust. Trust and privacy can, in a way, be described as two sides of the coin - inseparable 
elements in online transactions, varying, for the most, only in the viewpoint selected. 
 
  
4.1.2 Definition of trust 
 
What all these approaches towards trust do seem to have in common is the belief that 
introducing trust into the situation means that there is incomplete knowledge (parties involved 
do not know everything about the situation), and trusting behaviour means taking a risk: the 
trusting party becomes vulnerable to harm by the other party. Without such risk and without 
incomplete knowledge, trust is not needed. Further, in order to be willing to take such a risk, 
the trusting party has positive expectations about the good will of the other party (Friedman 
2000, Olson and Olson 2000). This forms the basic formulation for trust for our purposes 
here:  
 
with trust we mean succumbing into risky interaction with another party, with 
positive expectations about the goodwill of that other party.  
 
The goal of the technology designers (and us) is to inspire such trusting behaviour through 
igniting a cognitive state of trust in the users through the design that will, consequently, lead 
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to a smooth human-computer interaction due to trusting behaviour (Cassell and Bickmore 
2000, Shneiderman 2000). Futhermore, for simplicity's sake, we use the words “trusted” and 
“trustworthy” in an interchangeable manner, since from the user's perspective, these two 
terms fall in the behavioural level into the same category. For the user, any system that is 
considered trustworthy, is also trusted. 
 
 
4.2 Capturing human trust 
 
In previous studies, there have been many different approaches to the problem of forming 
trust. In July 1998 the U.S. Federal Trade Commission Chairman Robert Pitofsky suggested a 
model with four basic practices regarding the use and gathering of personal information about 
the users (Privacy Online 1998): 
  
• Sites should provide the user with information about their information collecting 
practices along with how they use the gathered information;  
• Sites should offer the user the possibility to choose how this information can be used 
for these other purposes;  
• Sites should offer the user access to gathered information with the opportunity to 
correct any inaccuracies and  
• Sites should strive to protect the security and integrity of that information.  
 
To guarantee that sites act according to such recommendations, imposing laws on online 
behaviour is an approach that seems to be favoured by the users, which is quite natural, but 
which in itself is not likely to be sufficient. Online trust depends on many factors, including 
consumer rights, freedom of expression, and social equity (Clarke 1999). Trusting an online 
service provided by a well-known bank is to a great extent based on users’ knowledge (or 
assumptions) about the laws binding all the business operations of the bank. In most studies 
about computer security – including ours – the users report on finding legislative intervention 
by the state desirable and necessary for promoting online trust (e.g. [P2], Hoffman et. al. 
1999). Furthermore, behind this trust in the legality of the bank is, to put it bluntly, the sub-
conscious trust in the basic structures of the society to remain stable, the trust in the status-
quo instead of anarchy — in short, the trust and belief in the good-doing nature of a social 
contract between men, in the Rousseauish sense (Rousseau 1762/1987). 
 
Another kind of “social contract” is suggested to be executed in the cooperative relationships 
built on the Net: According to the study by Hoffman et. al. (1999), over 72% of Web users 
would have been willing to provide the service provider with personal information if only the 
sites would provide the customers with a statement about how this information would be 
used. Still, it seems that users do not consider information about themselves as merchandise, 
to be sold to the highest-bidding offer: in the Hoffman et. al. Study (1999), most users were 
found not to be interested in selling their personal information. What is noteworthy in all this 
is that having legislation over the matter may not be enough, if users do not understand how 
the current laws should be applied in each situation. Further, having such legislation may be 
misleading, as legislation has trouble in following the technology developing at a high-speed 
accurately. Administration officials fear that regulation may not keep up with emerging 
technologies, and it is not a good idea to have existing regulation of legislation that cannot be 
enforced. In fact, it may give people wrong assurances about assumed security. Also, the 
existence of a specific law may make people think that things have been taken care of also 
security-wise, even if this might not be the case ([P2], Litman 2000). Legislation alone cannot 
be the answer to trustworthiness – other means are also needed.   
 
4.2.1 The Ecommerce Trust Study 
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The most comprehensive study on trust as regards the Internet in the beginning of our studies 
that we know of was the Ecommerce Trust Study committed as a joint research project by 
Cheskin Research and Studio Archetype/Sapient in January 1999 (Cheskin 1999). The study 
was made to find out about the nature of elements behind communicating trust to the user in 
ecommerce sites, both transactional and graphical. This research study was undertaken to 
determine the nature of those elements that communicate “trust” in ecommerce sites, be they 
transactional or graphical. The research objectives included the following: 
 
• Obtain consumer and expert feedback in order to identify the elements that 
communicate trust 
• Develop a “model of the building blocks of trust” based on that feedback; 
• Map the relative importance of the most fundamental components that communicate 
trustworthiness as a guide for builders of sites; 
• Learn more about the “state of the art” of Web site design; and 
• Explore a range of additional issues related to consumer perspectives on trust and 
ecommerce.  
 
The methodology in this study included 4 phases:  
 
1. Consumer questionnaires analysed to develop model of Internet trust  
2. 60 ecommerce sites audited on aspects of trust  
3. Expert discussion to refine model  
4. Consumer rankings of 8 sites that differed on the dimensions of fulfilment, brand and 
navigation 
 
It is to be noted that all questioning and discussion was conducted virtually, through web 
questionnaires and virtual chat-spaces, not face-to-face. 
 
The researchers came up with six fundamental forms to communicate trustworthiness online, 
as well as with a general understanding of the “state of the art” of the current situation in Web 
design as regards the issue of forming trust in the Web. According to this study, the six 
primary components to communicate ecommerce trust were considered the following:  
 
1. seals of approval – symbols, like VeriSign or Visa, to assure the visitor that security 
has been established  
2. brand – well-known brands are successful inside and outside Web  
3. navigation – the ease of finding what the visitor seeks  
4. fulfilment – information on how things will proceed and where to seek help if 
something goes wrong  
5. presentation – high-quality design that connotes quality and professionalism 
6. technology – high technology features connote professionalism, even if they are 
difficult to use  
 
 
According to the outcome of this study, to start trusting is slow: trust is formed gradually, it 
takes quite a lot of time and repeated good experiences. Online trust can be described in terms 
of a human relationship. The initial stage is that of interest and suspicion; there has to be a 
motivation, a need, to become interested in the service, but this curiosity is stamped with 
distrust and suspicious caution in the beginning of the usage of a new online service. Thus, 
according to this study, trust is formed slowly as a function of time, and the feeling of control 
forms the basis for trust. Navigation was found to be key to meeting user needs and was a pre-
condition to trust (which was a pre-condition to sales).  
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So, trust may, according to this study, best be described as a dynamic phenomenon, or as a 
process that starts with initial “indications” or “hints” – manner, professionalism, and 
sensitivity, for example – that enhance trust, and then slowly develops into “character traits” 
that receive an emotional response from the user. At this point the trustworthiness is best 
described through the concepts of dependability, reliability, and honesty. The behaviour 
towards the service is rather informal now, and the trustworthiness is not questioned anymore, 
at least not frequently. The user feels she has control over the situation, and over information 
about herself (Ecommerce Trust Study 1999).  
 
Our first user study took place before we became acquainted with the Ecommerce Trust 
study. It is, thus, of great interest that the outline and results of the two studies would prove to 
be very much alike, thus corroborating one another and adding to the credibility of both 
studies. There is, however, a major difference across the current study and all the 
above-mentioned user studies: most other studies that exist have used polls in form of 
questionnaires as their primary source of data. It was felt that there is need for a study with 
emphasis on qualitative user interviews. This was the part of the motivation for the choice of 
methodology for the studies presented here. 
 
The ecommerce trust study was repeated by Cheskin the following year, with some 
modifications (Cheskin 2000). This time the study concentrated more on differences between 
Northern and Latin American users, and indeed some variations in attitudes were detected. 
However, this work represents for the most only affirmative information on the results of the 
first study, and does not represent a novelty in its research design, so it is not dealt with in 
detail here.  
  
 
4.2.2 The Untrustworthiness of the Web 
 
Interest on the topic of online trust has also been expressed by Jacob Nielsen, a renowned 
usability guru, who has described the current state of the Web as one of untrustworthiness, 
where “customers are traded like sheep”, and has also conducted his own studies on trust that 
confirm this (Nielsen 1999a, further elaboration on Nielsen Norman 2001) (This statement 
has been further confirmed by other user studies, e.g., (Hoffman et al 1999)). In practice, this 
means that e-business has not taken the customers’ need for security into any consideration at 
all. According to Nielsen, this has to change, however, if one wants to establish any decent 
business on the Net, and other researchers strongly agree. A climate of trust (Nielsen 1999a, 
see also Rosenbloom 2000, [P3]) must be promoted whenever there is a need to create a 
functioning network in a virtual world, and that is what the electronic marketplace essentially 
is. Mutual trust is always needed for good-quality relationships, be they between two people, 
a group of people, or between a user and an online service. Trust is formed through 
experience, it is a long-term proposition – that is, it is hard to build and easy to lose (Nielsen 
1999a).  
 
Nielsen states that on a Web page, trustworthiness can be communicated through use of seals 
of approval, brand reputation, appropriate use of technology, and through design in the 
following way (Nielsen 1999a): 
 
• Design quality: professional appearance feels solid; clear navigation conveys respect 
for customers and an implied promise of good service. Typos or difficult navigation 
communicate disregard for the users.  
• Up-front disclosure of all aspects of the customer relationship. For example, 
shipping charges should be revealed immediately rather than waiting until after the 
user has placed an order. A few people may be cheated into ordering by hiding the 
shipping costs, but many more will abandon the site at an early stage of the process. 
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And those users who do get cheated will most likely be angry at being cheated, and 
will not become regular customers.  
• Comprehensive, correct, and current content and product selection feel solid. If a 
site has product photos, it should have good shots of all products. Haphazard, random 
content signal a brittle service – the web pages and the photos on them should be 
updated at the same rate as the products or services themselves are updated, not later.  
• Connected to the rest of the Web with links in and out. Not being afraid to link to 
other sites is a sign of confidence, and third-party sites are much more credible than 
anything you can say yourself. Isolated sites may feel like they have something to 
hide.  
 
Clearly, Nielsen’s recommendations are a good start for creating trustworthy design, and most 
of his suggestions are easy to follow. However, the notion of design quality remains 
somewhat unclear: what is meant with “professional appearance”? Unfortunately, Nielsen 
does not provide any further clarification of this notion. However, he goes on by declaring 
that users must be given a feeling of being in control and knowing what is happening. The 
notion of being in control has also come up as a major ingredient in promoting trust in other 
studies about users and trust as we have seen, e.g. (Cheskin 1999) presented above. Other 
such guidelines for inducing trust have also been presented (e.g. Friedman 2000, Olson and 
Olson 2000), but the contents of these is more or less the same as those presented in the 
(Cheskin 1999) and also by Nielsen (1999a).  
 
4.2.3 Credibility or trust? – the work of B.J. Fogg et al at Stanford 
 
At Stanford, B.J. Fogg has been conducting trust research based mostly on online 
questionnaires, but also user evaluations, for several years2. Interestingly, also Finns were 
included in their online query in 1999 in an online version of a local tabloid, where users’ 
bases of trust were investigated, providing a good basis for comparison with the user studies 
that form the corpus of this thesis, as well as with those conducted by Jarvenpaa and 
Tractinsky et al (1997, 1999). The Stanford research group has published actively in major 
forums and journals of HCI field, thus having quite a lot of impact on how trust is perceived 
in this field of research. A good summary of this work can be found in Fogg’s book on 
Persuasive Technology, were not less than 50 pages, in two separate chapters, have been 
dedicated to handling trust (Fogg 2003).  
 
Fogg prefers the term ‘credibility’ over trust, defining credibility as consisting of 
trustworthiness and expertise. Trustworthiness is defined as truthful, fair, and unbiased. 
Further, perceived similarity is seen as key ingredient in making something appear 
trustworthy. Expertise, on the other hand, is made up of perceived knowledge, skill, and 
experience of the source, judged against several cues, such as titles, labels, appearance cues, 
etc. Fogg emphasises the role of perception, talking about perceived trustworthiness and 
perceived expertise making up perceived credibility. This choice of terminology is justified 
by Fogg by stating that the term trust seems too vague. Fogg handles trust as part of this book 
because he sees trust as a central factor in persuasiveness3.Fogg deifnes, presents, and 
analyses various types of human-comuter interaction situations, where he believes credibility 
plays a crucial role. According to Fogg, credibility matters when computers 
 
1. instruct of advise users 
2. report measurements 
3. provide information and analysis 
4. report on work performed 
5. report about their own state 
                                                     
2 http://captology.stanford.edu/  
3 The main topic of this book is persuasiveness – how computer technology can change people’s behaviour and attitudes. 
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6. run simulations 
7. render virtual environments. 
 
On top of this, Fogg has built a novel kind of usability taxonomy. He sees credibility as 
consisting of four different types of credibility. These are: 
  
Type of credibility Basis for believability 
Presumed General assumptions in the mind of the perceiver 
Surface Simple inspection or initial firsthand experience 
Reputed Third-party endorsements, reports, or referrals 
Earned Firsthand experience that extends over time 
      Table 1. Credibility according to Fogg (2003). 
 
Fogg claims that dividing credibility in this way presents novel information. In a way, this is 
true. However, the novelty is mainly based on the fact that Fogg is using the term ’credibility’ 
instead of ’trust’. If we, again, swap the terms, there is hardly anything new in this analysis. 
Already in (Cheskin 1999) these different types and levels of trust are presented, so are the 
effects passing time and personal experience have on how trust is developed.  
 
The different credibility types can appear jointly or separately, and usually credibility is built 
up some kind of mixture of several credibility types according to Fogg. It would be 
interesting to try to find out, if and how various trust-demanding situations could be grouped 
according to the credibility type(s) they require. If successful, such analysis might be helpful 
in designing trusted services.  
 
Surface credibility, dealing with e.g. how the visual layout of a web service affects the 
credibility of that service, is interesting from the point of the discovered importance of online 
aesthetics to trust formation (e.g. Tractinsky 1997, Tractinsky et al 2000, [P7], Lavie et al 
2004, Lindgaard et al 2006, Cyr et al 2006). Many have tried to present design principles for 
trusted design (such as Cheskin 1999, Nielsen 1999, Egger 2001, 2003, Cyr et al 2006). The 
recent empirical studies by both (Riegelsberger 2003) and (Lindgaard et al 2006), as well as 
the ongoing cultural study by (Cyr et al 2006)  have corroborated the hypothesis about the 
significance of decision-making about trustworthiness on basis of aesthetic factors. This is 
especially the case, when other factors of credibility, such as e.g. reputation, do not apply 
(Lindgaard et al 2006). However, Fogg does not really elaborate on this topic, stating only 
that surface credibility plays an important role in trust-promotion, with a brief analysis of the 
ingredients of the affecting design. According to Fogg, these are: aesthetic pleasantness, 
fulfilment of positive expectations, and signs of importance, or power. Fogg also states that 
the ’design kit’ or formula for trust-inducing design still awaits its discoverer. 
 
Over 6000 respondents have participated in answering the questionnaires at Stanford. The 
study has been repeated every 2-3 years, with updates. Fogg is also planning to continue 
repeating the study, thus providing a longitudinal type of data on the development of user 
attitudes about credibility (trust) over time. A main benefit of quantifiable research that the 
questionnaires represent is that it enables such massive samples from the user base and the 
creation of trust information database.  
 
However, it is a good question whether the chosen line of study will prove best results in 
studying such an issue as trust fundamentally is. Trust is for a big part implicit and emotional, 
and starts building up on an unconscious level (e.g. Cheskin 1999, Lindgaard et al 2006, 
Camp 2003, [P1], [P7]). Users can in general not always report their own actions in a reliable 
manner even when dealing with simple, concrete issues such as reporting their morning 
activities (Norman 1986) – with trust issues, this is likely to be even less the case. In addition, 
advance evaluation of future actions is often quite difficult to users [P1]. Using preset 
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questionnaires and fixed-time phone interviews, can effectively stop the possibility for 
probing for getting deeper into the reasons behind the alleged answers.  
 
To give an example of the restrictions of this research line: in (Fogg et al 2003) is presented a 
credibility study where 10 different types of online services were analysed by 2684 users on 
basis of their perceived credibility. The most trust-inducing factors were visual design, 
information design, and information-centredness. But what do these concepts actually mean? 
The interpretation of such issues by ordinary users is a challenging task, and 
misinterpretations can lead to serious deviations in the validity of the gathered data and its 
analysis. Even though user evaluations are used, their gain is disputable if the terminology 
used is ambiguous, and especially if the answers of the respondents are not probed any deeper 
into. In the case of visual design, even graphic design professionals cannot agree on its 
meaning to an agreeable level, as (Lindgaard et al 2006) have shown. Since trained graphic 
designers are more likely to share common understanding on the ingredients of the visual 
design on basis of receiving similar type of training, it is likely that if their opinions on these 
factors shows such strong deviation, this will be amplified among the ‘average’ users and 
their opinions. Luckily, also Fogg admits to the vaguenss of the categories used. 
 
The topics of research Fogg has selected are quite interesting and one would expect more 
from the results. However, they do not succeed in going beyond surface level, even if also UI 
evaluations of existing services were also used as a method. This may be due to not only the 
selected methods but also to the fact that it is very challenging to study via any methods – 
many have tried it, sometimes with poor results despite major efforts. It seems that combining 
various research tactics is likely to bring the best results in trust research: a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative techniques will probably be best. The Ecommerce trust study 
(Cheskin 1999) was an early, good example of such research design, user evaluations with 
expert analysis, and more.  
 
  
4.2.4 Consumer Trust: Consumer WebWatch Web Credibility Project 
 
Princeton Survey Research Associates (www.psra.com, PSRA) has gained wide publicity on 
their trust study in 2002 and repeated in 2005. This study bears some similarity to the 
Ecommerce Trust Study by (Cheskin 1999, 2000) discussed earlier. Consumer Reports 
WebWatch, who ordered these studies from PSRA, is a independent, non-commercial 
organisation that opearates on the customer interests (http://www.consumerwebwatch.org).  
 
The study is a national study, conducted in the U.S. via phone interviews based on a 
questionnaire. In all, 1501 Internet users were interviewed about various areas about their 
Internet usage. 
 
The results of the 2005 study indicate that trust had diminished from that of 2002  
 
• Nine out of ten U.S. citizens over 18 Internet users had changed their online 
behaviour in order to protect their identity in the fear of identity theft. 
• Of these changes, 30% involves less overall usage of the Internet. 
• 25% had stopped making any online shopping. 
• Of those still conducting online shopping, 29% was buing less frequently online. 
 
As major threats was seen identity theft as well as losing money to malicious actors. Online 
merchants were trusted slightly more than auctioners. Online news services and news group 
were trusted as much in 2005 than in 2002. Instead, the information companies were 
providing about themselves was clearly distrusted.  
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Users had become more analytic about the basis for choosing a specific online merchant over 
its competitors by 2005:  
 
• 88% considered the privacy of personal informantion very important  
• 81% considered the trustworthiness of information to be very important (up by 1%) 
• 76% considered the visibility of sources of presented information very important (up 
by 8%) 
• 73% considered the timeliness of the information and frequent updates very important 
(up by 8%) 
• 48% considered the visibility of ownership very important (up by 16%)  
 
Internet was rather well trusted as an information provider. Users had, however, become more 
critical in 2005, and were expecting the following factors from news services in order to trust 
them:   
 
• 69% wanted to see a clear difference between advertisements and the news (up by 
10%) 
• Users wanted to be able to identiy the face behing the news; also a feedback channel 
was found to be important. 47%  considered showing the editor’s email address very 
important (up by 11%)  
• 44% found it very important that the news service would publish corrections and 
clarifications to previous news in a central place. (up by 10%) 
• 31% considered very important that the financial ties of the publisher of the news 
service were clearly announced (up by 9%) 
 
 
Unfortunately, from the study it cannot be really deduced what the users base their 
judgements on. For example considering that one’s privacy is being preserved is not straight-
forward but can be ambiguous. It would be interesting to try to find out, what kind of privacy 
criteria the users could identify as basis for these judgements. The same is true about judging 
the trustworthiness of information which in this study seems to be more or less based on the 
visibility of the author identity and having a feedback channel, preferably directly to the 
authors or editors themselves.   
 
It is interesting that according to the study it takes more trust to conduct banking online than 
is needed for online shopping. According to the outcomes of the user studies that form the 
basis for this thesis, in Finland users were quite trusting towards online banking already in 
1999, when all other online shopping was still considered quite untrustworthy and few were 
doing it. [P1] One reason behind this was that in Finland there exists a great amount of trust 
towards the banks. In the studies it was found out that this trust was based to a great extent on 
the fact that the operations of the banks are tightly governed by laws. Further basis for trust 
towards the banks was that users felt that banks had to be able to be trustworthy online, since 
if they failed this, the users would lose their trust toward their bank altogether and take all 
their business to another bank. In other words, the users were thinking that for these reasons 
the banks were forced into securing their online services to the level of truly being worthy of 
their trust. In a way these views were so strong that the attitudes of the users were almost 
reaching the situation where they felt they did not need any trust towards the banks at all, 
since there was in fact no risk – a leap of faith would not be needed. Instead, the expertise of 
online vendors in taking care of the security of the transactions was not trusted, and the users 
felt that here, trust would be needed but that trust did not exist. In any case, the U.S. users 
were more trusting towards the online banks than towards the online vendors – same as in 
Finland.  
 
 42
Also of interest in the study is that the most active online users were very trusting towards the 
services they used the most. If services were trusted only a little, they were actually not used. 
This is in line with the outcomes of the Ecommerce Trust Study: once a certain level of trust 
is needed, the trustworthiness of the service is no longer questioned, in order to ease the 
decision-making process. The reasons behind this also involve the need for humans to 
rationalize their behaviour and believe in the validity of their own decision-making. Once the 
usage of a service has been initiated on basis of some initial trust, this decision is no longer 
repeated but the decision is ’once-and-for-all’ unless something bad happens (Cheskin 1999). 
This is a nice showcase on how the existence of trust simplifies the practical life and vice 
versa: the absence of trust makes life more complicated (Fukuyama 1995). 
 
In all, the study clearly shows that the current level of user demands for willingness to base 
trust on the Internet actors has grown. Since these demands are not yet met, the users are 
expressing less trust towards the Internet than before. This trust will not be recovered until the 
online vendors find ways to answer these needs, and online use will not be growing at the 
expected rate. 
 
 
4.3 Frameworks for trust 
 
A big part of the existing trust research has focused on attempts to clarify and formalise the 
concept of trust. As this is a complex concept that can be viewed in many different ways, 
depending on the current issue at hand and area of study. In order to succeed in understanding 
trust and in building usable trust management systems also technically, it has become a 
necessity to try to create consensus across these different approaches to trust about the 
contents of this multi-faceted concept. Recently, a bunch of studies have concentrated on 
exactly these issues.  
 
4.3.1 The Work of L. Jean Camp 
 
Professor L. Jean Camp, currently with Indiana University, has many publication on the area 
of trust, spanning over several years. She bases her concept of trust in the work of Niklas 
Luhmann (1979) 
 
Camp states as her fundamental research question the possibly neutrality of trust, what comes 
to representing human values. She has examined this question in identity management, voting 
systems and in ecommerce. Her working hypothesis is “that an examination of trust 
assumptions in security systems illustrates embedded values, and in particular these 
assumptions become embedded through technical simplifying assumptions that create social 
complexity”, as she states on her university homepages (www.ljean.com). 
 
Camp’s book on the trust and risk in Internet commerce (Camp 2000), was one among the 
first to investigate the social patterns of online contexts. Camp has also made research on 
digital identities (Camp 2004), providing a quite usable identity taxonomy that could be tested 
with real users. In (Camp 2003), she has also provided an accurate classification of various 
types of privacy. (Camp et al 2001) present early work on placing online trust in the right 
social context. This work has been continued till this day, and is currently expressed in the 
work for the design of NetTrust, a browser-based tool for managing online trust, which is 
based on the previous work and will also be usability tested before release (Camp 2006). 
 
The work of Camp is quite interesting, because she brings together a thouroug understanding 
of both the economical, technical, and social issues involved in making trust management 
more human. Despite the original lack of actual user studies, the research approach of Camp 
comes very close to that of the author of this work, with the difference that in the work at 
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hand, the understanding of the economical side is not very strong, and relies completely on 
the work of others.  
 
Camp’s work is further analysed in connection with the following various subchapters, in 
relation to other work in this area. 
 
4.3.2 Measuring trust 
 
In their work for creating a secure knowledge management system, (Bertino and Sandhu 
2005), find out that the need to define trust in a measurable way becomes evident. They state 
that the problem with current trust definitions is that all these definitions is that they provide a 
notion of trust for which establishing metrics and developing evaluation methodologies are 
quite difficult. They decide to build their definition on top of (Blaze et al 1996), according to 
whom, “Trust management problems include formulating security policies and security 
credentials, determining whether particular sets of credentials satisfy the relevant policies, and 
deferring trust to third parties”. Such a definition of trust refers to security policies regulating 
accesses to resources and credentials that are required to satisfy such policies. TN thus refers 
to the process of credential exchanges that allows a party requiring a service or a resource 
from another party to provide the necessary credentials in order to obtain the service or the 
resource (Bertino and Sandhu 2005). 
 
In the HCI side, David Gefen from Drexel University has published many articles where he 
has brought up the multidimensional nature of trust, in order to make the trust ingredients 
measurable. He has chosen this approach since he found the previous treatments too holistic 
and felt that it would probably be more fruitful to chop down the concept to its ingredients, 
and then evaluate their relative meaning to the formation of the overall trust. By means of 
statistical significance, he has tried to prove that this approach is valid.   
 
Gefen divides overall trust into three factors. These are the actor’s 1) integrity 2) benevolence, 
and 3) ability. In fact, these three factors are quite traditional factors of trust from the 
technical point of view (e.g. Ganesan 1994, Shneier 2000). The purpose of Gefen’s research, 
then, is to demonstrate that these traditional ingredients of overall trust can be shown to be 
effective in such a way that can be measured with statistical methods. According to Gefen, 
trust can be examined by analysing its ingredients, but also on a general level, as a sum of 
these ingredients as overall trust, where the identified ingredients can play a role with varying 
weight depending on the situation at hand. The key point is that the individual weights each 
ingredient has on a given situation, could be measurable.  
 
Even if Gefen’s attempt to formalise the ingredients of trust into a measurable format is valid, 
its merits are disputable. Even though the weights of different trust factors could now be 
analysed, how exactly to apply this information for trusted design, for example, remains to be 
solved. Gefen has ended up with results according to which for example window shopping 
and shopping involving actual transactions (closure) vary in the weights that the individual 
factors have in the formation of the overall trust in these situations. This seems rather 
intuitive: also in our user studies it has clearly come up that the shopping intention differs 
from the actual shopping situation in the amount of trust needed, especially so in the actual 
paying situation, where there appear new criteria for the trustworthiness of the transaction 
[P1], [P4]. Also other consumer research confirms these findings. For example, Deloitte 
(http://www.deloitte.com) published in December 2005 a ’Christmas Survey’, where it was 
found that shopping-wise, Internet is mainly used for three types of actions: 1) familiarising 
with product offering and shops available;  2) price comparison; and 3) actual purchases4. 
These three sides of shopping are clearly separate in amount of trust needed (see also 
                                                     
4http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/press_release/0,1014,sid%253D2834%2526cid%253D103623,00.html  
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Conclusions). This is precisely the same point Gefen (2002) has wanted to prove. Readiness 
to engage in a transaction demands more from that transaction than mere surfing, even when 
this surfing has a purpose and a goal. The outcome that the three ingredients of trust would 
gain different weighs in these three different situations seems only logical.  
 
However, the impact of Gefen’s research to understanding of trust seems relatively small. In a 
further article in the same research line, Gefen has identified three problems in trust research, 
trying to provide solutions to them (Gefen et al 2002).. These problems are 1) oversimplifying 
the concepts of trust and risk, 2) the unresolved nature of the relationship between 
trustworthiness and trust, and 3) the idiosyncratic nature of the relationship between trut and 
risk. This analysis seems, however, not to lead to any new conclusions. Also (Araujo and 
Araujo 2003) state in their excellent review on current trust research that these attempts to 
clarify the concept of trust have not led to any consensus about the scope and precise contents 
of this multi-faceted concept, so their offering remains disputable. Araujo and Araujo present 
a handbook type of an overview of reseach on the topic, listing, in a down-to-earth way, the 
current state of trust research, significance of analysing the risks, the special requirements of 
the making the actual transaction, and providing also a set of design guidelines for increasing 
the usability of security, together with an extended bibliography. However, connecting these 
analyses to the work of, e.g. (Bertino and Sandhu 2005) would be quite difficult, and it seems 
likely that these different types of research lines will continue having a hard time connecting. 
 
This seems characteristic of the discussion at hand – it is philosophical by nature and it is 
unlikely that consensus would truly be reached. Further, such consensus may after all be 
unnecessary – as in the case of the concept of “good-enough security”, also with trust it may 
be enough to reach a sufficient level of trust, characteristic of each situation. Also, the views 
presented recently cannot really claim novelty: already in 2000 appeared an excellent work  
by (Grandison and Sloman 2000) that lists most of the issues currently being ‘discovered’. 
The paper, named A Survey of Trust in Internet Applications, states, among other things that 
chopping overall trust into smaller parts is not likely to be too useful, since most applications 
and solutions involve more than one factor. They also present a taxonomy of trust, 
categorizing various types of trust needs on basis of 1) access control to own, private 
resources, 2) assessing the trustworthiness of a service provider, 3) trust problems related to 
authentication (identifying the actors reliably and having the authorizations and rights they 
claim to have) and 4) delegating trust. The concept of trust they define as “…the firm belief in 
the competence of an entity to act dependably, securely, and reliably within a specified 
context (assuming dependability covers reliability and timeliness)”.  
 
This paper not so often referred to has its main emphasis on the request for clarifying the 
concept of trust in such a way that it could be translated into formal logic in order to be able 
to run a formal analysis on the causal relations of trust and other factors. However, Grandison 
and Sloman also present many other ideas that only now are being recognized by other, such 
as need for design toolkit for creating, analysing and monitoring trust relations; observation 
on the need to define not only trust but also distrust – often neglected other side of the coin – 
and the possibility to express not only trust but also distrust; and suggestion to apply risk 
analysis from economics to trust analysis.  
 
4.3.3 The Work of M.A. Sasse et al 
 
Sasse is one of the authors in (Adams and Sasse 1999b), one of the ‘classics’ in the field of 
usability and security, and Sasse has made, with her group, a considerable contribution to this 
area in all. A generic framework of trust has been the goal of also the group by Sasse in 
London: either come up with the methodological foundations for how to study trust 
(Riegelsberger et al 2003), or providing critical analysis of current approaches, and 
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suggesting new ones to replace them, including a game theoretical approach (Riegelsberger et 
al 2005).  
 
In the work of Sasse et al, Grounded theory methods of qualitative field research are used, 
where results are come up with through the method of inductive reasoning have emerged 
from the social sciences (Glaser and Strauss1967/1980, Endres-Niggemeyer 1999). In the 
grounded theories, the theory based on observations in the field makes an incremental growth 
based on the findings. While much empirical research starts with a set of hypotheses and tests 
these hypotheses against empirical data, grounded theories are developed incrementally from 
empirical observation. A candidate concept or proposition is discovered and integrated into 
the emergent theory.  Concepts are re-arranged periodically, leading to the gradual emergence 
of higher-level concepts. As new knowledge arises it is integrated into the theory. The theory 
approaches validity as changes engendered by new data (Sasse, 1997; Endres-Niggemeyer 
1999). This approach is then combined with a multitude of methods derived from standard 
HCI involving user observation and usability testing, experimental psychology, eye-
movement tracking, and even game theory.  
 
We have already presented much of Sasse’s work in previous chapters of this work, e.g. on 
usability of security, users as the weakest link, in the area of privacy, so it will not be repeated 
here. Sasse et al have also made major efforts to improve password usability (e.g. Brostoff 
and Sasse 2000, 2003). Also, the work of Riegelsberger, who has worked under Sasse’s 
guidance, will be dealt with later, when the various elements of trust are discussed. Quite 
recent work of Sasse’s group is investigating the structure of recommender systems, searching 
ways to improve their usability (Bonhard et al 2006). In this paper, they are proposing to 
enhance the usefulness of recommender systems by including more information about 
recommenders to the system. The research is based on a laboratory online experiment with 
100 participants simulating a movie recommender system to determine how familiarity of the 
recommender, profile similarity between decision-maker and recommender, and rating 
overlap with how a particular recommender influences the choices of decision-makers in such 
a context. While familiarity – a factor found earlier to promote readiness to trust others – in 
this experiment did not affect the participants' choices, Bonhard et al report that profile 
similarity and rating overlap had a significant influence. These results were suggested to be 
helpful in understanding the decision-making processes in an online context and form the 
basis for user-centred social recommender system design. According to the researcher, by 
enriching the user information of the recommender systems, the social context is re-embedded 
to the virtual environment, thus enabling better-based trust decisions.  
 
The work of Sasse et al is closely related to the more technical trust research, where for 
example Yolum & Singh (2003), have, in the area of artificial intelligence, analysed the 
possibility of automation of trust expressions: how autonomous agents, operating 
independently in large, open, and distributed environments (such as the Internet), could find 
out about the relative trustworthiness – or untrustworthiness – of  the other agents. The need 
to be able to automate expressions on such level clearly is a necessity – however, once again 
the problem of how to define trust arises.  
 
Yolum & Singh bring institutional trust to the foreground. The initial trust in this type of 
situations is based on trust in a known authority. In real life such authorities are, for example, 
established institutions, in a distributed system the licensors of digital certificates. However, 
the problem in an open environment such as Internet is that there is no central authority that 
could automatically provide the initial trust to the actors of that environment. This means that 
the initial trust and authorization as a trusted party must be brought into the open system in 
some way or the other. The available options are local and social trust. Social trust means 
recommender systems, where the recommendations by others, preferably from verifiable 
sources, form the basis for trust. One way to do this is to build referrals from one service to 
another. Current P2P systems are built on such models, e.g. eBay. Even if the system has its 
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flaws, it seems to be working ‘well enough’ for users to be willing to use this type of systems. 
Local trust means simply that the user bases his trust on own first-hand experiences of the 
online actors. No separate authorization is needed in the latter case – the trust is based on 
user’s own decision-making – the risk is also left to the user, which might not be very 
tempting to the users of these systems.  
 
Yolum and Singh notice that the previous attempts to certify trust have been based either 
social or local trust described above. They propose a new model, where both types of trust are 
involved. In their suggestion, the agents are gathering information on each other’s 
trustworthiness locally, but can also provide for referrals for other actors of the system. 
Involving both types will, according to the authors, lead to  the capturing of two features 
about trust that is not possible for other systems built on one type of trust alone: 1) when 
small amounts of money are involved, users tend to be ready to trust also less well-known 
actors, whereas when the sums go up also the perceived (and real) risk is higher and more 
trust tends to be needed. Further, 2) the transfer of trust becomes possible: if a service-
provided is experienced as trustworthy provided of one type of services, this trust is 
transferred to other types of services provided by the same service-provider. In other words, 
also in the interactions of autonomous agents trust is based on cumulative experiences of the 
past behaviour of the good and bad actors. This type of ‘trust negotiations’ between agents are 
currently one of the central research issues in the technical trust research.  
 
Research on the significance of reciprocal referrals and links for trust promotion can be done 
from another perspective, too: Stewart and Zhang (2003) have analysed how hypertext links 
from one web service to another diminish or amplify the trust felt towards the linked services. 
Mutual links was one of the corner stones of trust already according to the (Cheskin 1999). 
According to Stewart and Zhang, the less well-known online actors will indeed benefit from 
linkage with a better-known service. Instead, the better-known service-providers should take 
care with their linking policies, since links to less known or even unknown services may 
lessen the trust felt towards the otherwise well-known service, if the users do not trust the 
linked services. Furthermore, links denoting a partnership between the linked services were 
found as more trust promoting than mere commercials. However, it was difficult for the users 
to judge which type of linkage they were dealing with.  
 
In an earlier study, Stewart has shown that how users group various actors of the online 
environment had major effect on the trust transfer between the services forming the groups 
(Stewart 2003). Thus, links between services has indeed proved to be one of factors definitely 
affecting the formation of online trust, as was hypothesized on basis of previous work.   
 
 
4.4 On the various elements of trust 
 
The conditions of trust vary, and till now no clarity exists in how the various ingredients of 
trust contribute to the overall trust. Some of these ingredients have, however, been identified 
and can be further studied, even when their combinatory effects yet remain uncharted. We 
have seen the reciprocal linkage is one such ingredient; others include at least usage of 
images, feeling of privacy, informativeness, and the understandability of information, 
visibility of information and system state, etc.5. There are many candidates, and they may have 
co-dependencies. We will now have a look at the current state of research on some of these 
suggested trust ingredients.  
 
4.4.1 Usage of images 
 
                                                     
5 Good lists on these elements can be found e.g. in Cheskin 1999, Nielsen 1999, Araujo and Araujo 2003, or Basu et al 2003. 
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How using images in, say, a web service affects trust building is a topic that was identified as 
meaningful in (Cheskin 1999) and later taken up by (Riegelsberger et al 2003). Riegelsberger 
has explored how photos of people on web pages affect the trust felt towards the service. The 
starting point for the research was on understanding the mechanisms in marketing, where 
pictures of smiling, happy people had been used for a long time in advertisements in order to 
create positive feelings – and trust – in the audience towards the advertised product.  
 
To verify these assumptions to hold also in the online environment, Riegelsberger et al 
designed a set of user studies to gain experimental results on the phenomenon. Riegelsberger 
used eye-tracking methods for finding out about the ingredients behind trust, in order to 
overcome the fact that trust reports by the users themselves can only be partial due to the 
nature of the trust formation. Riegelsberger showed users services with photographs of people 
in this study. As research hypothesis, on basis of results from previous trust research (e.g.. 
Fogg 2002, Olson et al 2002), and from advertising, explained earlier, about the trust-
promoting effect of using pictures. 
 
Even if the research in part confirmed the existing knowledge, the results were divided, 
showing that the trust-promoting effect of people’s picture is not as straightforward as was 
formerly believed. They seem to make it more confusing for users to try to come up with an 
evaluation of the trustworthiness of the service, leading also to somewhat surprising results: 
the trustworthy, established online services seemed to lose some trust due to the effect of the 
pictures, whereas the untrustworthy ones were gaining on trust received. In other words, users 
were making wrong decisions about trustworthiness because of the pictures.  
 
Adding pictures is categorized as adding a surface cue for trust formation. Such surface cues 
are commonplace in everyday life, where the expressions, gestures, tone of voice, and 
clothing of other people trigger trust or distrust in us towards the other people. Same applies 
for physical stores, where the general atmosphere, behaviour of the staff, etc, guide us 
towards a decision about their trustworthiness (see also Camp et al 2003). In the cyberspace, 
such cues can be presented via pictures, and also via seals of trust or links to others who are 
considered trustworthy, for example. The idea is that trust would be infectious; spreading 
from one actor to the other, if there is a link between the two actors. The trust association 
between the two actors, in the user’s mind, may happen on an unconscious level, and consists 
of both a rational and emotional ingredient, according to Riegelsberger et al.  
 
Furthermore, the pictures create confusion to trust decisions only on first-time viewing. On 
the following viewings, users ignore the pictures (see also Riegelsberger et al 2002). One 
reason for confusion seemed to be a mismatch between the style of the picture and the 
service: if the styles were different, users did not know what to think about it. This is 
reminiscent of using advertisements, where happy, smiling faces with otherwise suspicious-
looking content may create a affective dissonance in the spectator. 
 
The research was conducted by placing the users in a real situation involving a risk instead of 
just interviewing them or making them fill a questionnaire. This is very good, since “actions 
speak louder than words” also in usability work: as in any situation, people may say one thing 
and do something completely different. Further, Riegelsberger states that trust is difficult to 
study via interviews, since people have a need to see and present themselves as rational 
decision-makers, at least in the current Western society. This is very true, and this is why also 
in the user studies forming the basis for this work, care was taken to watch for this effect, and 
observing actual usage was added to the methodological toolbox, whenever possible. Using 
eye tracking is also an interesting method, although interpreting the massive amounts of data 
collected can be quite challenging. 
 
Riegelsberger also tries to make use of economical decision-making theories for analysing 
trust decisions in situations where the risk involved is a financial one. Even though already 
 48
(Jarvenpaa et al 2000) can be seen as attempting such an analysis, integrating economical 
studies to the user studies of trust in novel ways would most probably be quite useful. 
 
4.4.2 New types of trust certifiers 
 
The need for some kind of intermediaries in order to create trust has been suggested by many. 
Sometimes this role of the intermediary is filled with a governmental office, legislation, new 
entrepreneurs such as TRUSTEe, as well as such traditional ‘trust managers’ as banks and 
insurance companies. On the other hand, the need for this trust has been sought to be 
minimised, by introducing stronger means of encryption, and data protection, firewalls, 
certificates, and so on. However, these types of certifiers have not been enough to make 
online transactions prosper, so new ideas are needed.  
 
(Tang et al 2003) introduce an idea about taking an insurance against online threats. The idea 
is simple: since engaging in online businesses is insecure, there emerges a possibility for a 
new type of online vendor that can make money by acting as guarantor for these transactions. 
In short, the idea is to buy trust in a way. The idea seems feasible except for the fact that how 
can the guarantor actually guarantee the transactions?  
 
According to Tang et al, insurances are needed for three types of  trust:  
 
• Marketspace trust. The trust that both seller and buyer must have in the 
marketspace where the transaction will occur. 
• Buyer’s trust. The trust that the buyer has that the goods will be delivered as 
agreed. 
• Seller’s trust. The trust that the seller has that he or she will be paid for the 
delivered goods. 
 
The meaningfulness of the idea of such insurances was tested with users in Singapore and 
South Korea, via a questionnaire type inquiry (25 claims, 5-point Likert-scale). 35 businesses 
from Singapore and 38 from South Korea participated in the study. The questionnaire was 
answered in interaction with the researcher in order to ensure that the respondents would 
understand the claims in a correct way. More data was gathered via in-depth interviews in 
seven companies operating in either the insurance or technology field.  
 
The outcome of the study is not very surprising. Users were at first rather enthusiastic about 
the possibility of taking an insurance against untrustworthy online actors. However, when 
they learned they would have to pay for it, the readiness to use money for such insurance was 
very low. This is a rather typical reaction towards computer security: users would rather get it 
for free, maybe because it does not seem to bring ‘added value’. Rather than paying, users 
were more willing to either take their chances or withdraw from the transactions in all. 
 
Tang et al claim that the unwillingness to pay is against the common policies of the Internet, 
where people expect everything to be free. The buying motives for online shopping also entail 
getting things cheaper and more conveniently than elsewhere – a new payment conflicts with 
these expectations. Further, with a new charge added to the cheaper price, the final price may 
come so close to the offline price that the motivation to conduct online shopping disappears 
altogether. Taking an insurance also brings extra troubles to the transaction, and in user’s 
mind may be compared with, for example, the logistics in physically moving to the shop and 
back home. Since in normal stores the trust issues are not so pending, the added cost may lead 
the user, again, withdraw from online transactions.   
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(Chong et al 2003) analyse the trust chains in somewhat similar fashion. They present an 
analysis on factors promoting trust or distrust in the users of online auction such as eBay or 
Yahoo! Auction. Chong et al see the need to certify only 1) the trustworthiness of the vendor 
and 2) the trustworthiness of the mediary. The outcome of this study comes down to noticing 
the cultural differences between the American and Chinese users, participating in the study, 
on a very abstract level. According to Chont et al, the American individualists base more of 
their trust in explicit trust seals and on themselves, whereas the more communally oriented 
Chinese trust only people they know personally or their own first-hand experience.  
 
(Salam et al 2003) suggest that not only the traditional institutions of trust of the physical 
world, but also well-established online actors with a well-earned, long-term positive 
reputation, such as Amazon or eBay, might be able to act as guarantors. P2P 
recommendations that these both online actors use have already been successful in creating 
trust in the user towards their services – even when according to Salam et al, users also 
express some suspicion and distrust towards such P2P recommendation systems.  
 
Furthermore, since actions in the online environment require more trust cues than physical 
world, where there are many implicit trust cues (e.g. Camp 2004), and often the whole 
transaction process is completely visible to user, there might be a need for more than one type 
of trust provides, not just the guarantors, for enabling trust in the online environment. These 
could include 1) the actual guarantors, 2) advisors, e.g. state authorities, and as a new type, 3) 
established online entrepreneurs, such as Amazon (Salam et al 2003). (Bonhard et al 2006) 
have  
 
4.4.3 Trust and risk 
 
Discussion on the relation of trust and risk in the context of online environments was more or 
less initiated by (Camp 2000). In her book, she was laying the groundwork for considering the 
risks of the Internet business, identifying the avoidable hazards which were, in her view, 
likely to be found on the road towards realisation of the Internet commerce. 
 
Starting an important research line, risk perception has since then become one of the focal 
points of trust research. Researchers from Cheskin have treated this issue in their contribution 
to the 2002 edition of The Human-Computer Interaction Handbook (Diller et al 2002). Trust 
is depicted as an enabler of interaction with society, along with legislation. The idea as such is 
not new (e.g. Fukuyama 1995), However, for trust research the classification of different 
types of risks embedded in trust decisions, is insightful.  
 
According to the authors, when a person or corporation considers lowering the walls to act in 
the world, they have historically faced six types of risk, four of which often involve direct 
economic transactions: 
 
1. financial (risk of losing money or paying too much); 
2. functional (risk of receiving the wrong or a malfunctioning product); 
3. social (risk of embarrassment); and 
4. physical (risk that we might be physically harmed). 
 
In addition, engaging with the world puts us at risk in two other ways: 
5. emotional (risk that one might be emotionally hurt by an interaction); and 
6. identity (risk that others may impersonate us for financial or other types of gain). 
 
The goal of being able to trust, then, is risk reduction.  
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Defining different types of risk seems quite useful from trust research perspective. Parallel to 
the analysis of the multi-faceted nature of trust, a similar analysis to risk – an undeniable 
factor in trust-formation – is recommendable. Using the approach by Gefen (2000, 2002) 
reported earlier, the significance of the existence of some type of risk or their combination in 
a trust situation – a primary requirement for the need of trust in the first place – could undergo 
a similar analysis, where the sum effect of various types of risks could become calculable.  
 
First, we would need to analyse, what types of risks appear in what type of situations. For 
example, when conducting online transactions as in online shopping, risks number (1), (2), 
possibly also (3), and (6) will be present. On the other hand, being active in newsgroups or 
chat rooms seems to denote the existence of the risks (3), (4), (5), and (6): using these 
services may not be socially acceptable for some people, and depending on their topic – 
meeting an online ‘friend’ may also realise the physical risk, if one is unlucky. If the purpose 
of being online is to find a life partner, the emotional risk grows. Also, identity theft (6) – for 
example, getting one’s online nick name stolen for somebody else’s use – is a serious risk in 
most situations. Understanding the type of risk we are dealing with in each situation and 
linking them with the ingredients of trust might make this part of the trust decision-making 
measurable. Further, on basis of this understanding, a designer of an online service might 
ultimately be able to help users notice the risks involved and act accordingly, thus leading to 
increased feeling of control of the service, and further to increased amount of trust towards 
that service. It remains to be seen, whether drawing such connections between all these 
ingredients is possible or worthwhile.  
 
Salam et al (2003) provide an interesting handling on how risks are perceived in (Salam et al 
2003). They start by listing as obstacles of online shopping the common distrust of consumers 
towards online shopping security and the unwillingness to take personal risk by engaging in 
the transactions, and the impossibility of building long-term customership between online 
vendors and users. What is novel in their work is setting risk aversion in centrefold. Salam et 
al also state that users have practically no means either to perceive or evaluate the risks in 
each situation in a realistic fashion. 
 
The cure for better perception of risks that in effect would lead to trust enhanced towards the 
service, is offered using the traditional sources of trust outside the cyberworld for promoting 
trust. These include banks, insurance companies and other authorities, such as state offices. 
These traditional actors could find a new role as guarantors also in online transactions. On 
basis of user studies presented here (e.g. [P1]), this would probably work: these actors, if 
online also, are already trusted more by the users than other online actors. Users in [P1] were 
very trusting of their online banks, and would have hoped for all payments to be possible via 
a link to their online bank.  
 
Another interesting remark by Salam et al is that when the financial (or other, such as 
desirability) incentive grows, users are more willing to engage in transactions they otherwise 
would consider too risky. This feature came up also in  [P1] and [P4].. Salam et al interpret 
this as users perceiving the risk in such situation as smaller than it actually is; however, on 
basis of our user studies, it can be claimed that the users may be well aware of the risk, but if 
the product to be bought is much cheaper online or not available elsewhere yet quite 
desirable, users seem to be willing to give up on their normal ‘trust level’ – the risk is better 
endured, in hope of better gain. This could be formalised as a ‘law’ where there exists a 
correlation between the threshold value of tolerable risk and the financial incentive. The risk 
evaluations are not fixed but co-dependent with the possible gain: if the possible gain is 
perceived as greater than the possible negative effects of the risk realised and the damage it 
may cause, users are willing to take that risk. It would be interesting to be able to convert 
these risk evaluations computational somehow, in order to build a mathematical hypothesis on 
the co-dependence of risk evaluation and financial incentive. 
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4.5 Other related work 
 
Some other related work on trust include (Friedman et al 2000, Shneiderman 2000) on 
bringing trust research to the awareness of wider audience; and for some novel 
recommendations on how to enhance trust (e.g. Friedman et al 2000, Olson and Olson 2000). 
The effect of different modalities on building trust has also become one of the topics of 
current trust research (see e.g. Rocco 1998, Jensen et al 2000). A lot of work is ongoing on 
accessibility issues (e.g. Cardoso et al 2002, Hwang et al 2002, Keates et al 2002), and the 
universal access issues should also be considered from the point of trust and trusting 
behaviour. Furthermore, it seems inevitable that some new legislation is also needed to 
guarantee common rules for all online transactions (see e.g. Litman 2000).  
 
Trust has also been approached from the viewpoint of the credibility and preservability of 
information by Hart & Liu (2003). This research stems from the problems with archiving 
information: how can users be made to trust digital archives as replacements for the 
traditional means of archiving.  Another new area where trust is crucial is healthcare gone 
digital. It goes without saying that the needs for trustworthiness and privacy as well as the 
integrity of the data, to name a few, are of utmost importance in this area (e.g. Luo & Najdawi 
2004).  
 
Also of interest is a study by Teltzrow et al (2003), where the effects of multi-channel 
delivery on the formation of trust were investigated: if an online vendor also has a physical 
presence as a ’normal’ vendor, does this promote the trust towards this vendor? It appears, 
according to their study that their hypothesis on the positive effect to online trust of the 
physical presence, depending on the physical size of the vendor, was somewhat corroborated 
in the study.  The work was built on the outcomes of (Jarvenpaa & Tractinsky 1999), 
according to which the perceived size and reputation have an effect on the trust felt towards 
the online vendor. 
 
Easy-to-use authentication methods (Basu 2003, Frescha et al 2005), trusted design (Camp 
2003), toolkits for promoting trust (Yang et al 2005, Wang et al 2005) etc will certainly be an 
important part of trust research also in the near future. In addition, the multi-disciplinary 
nature of trust studies is likely to expand: one example of this is introducing the theories from 
personal psychology to understanding, for example, different personality traits and their effect 
in making trust decisions online (Feng et al 2003, Saariluoma 2004).  
 
Kim et al (2003), on the other hand, have concentrated on investigating the meaning of the 
feeling of satisfaction in consumer experience and the feeling of trust it gives rise to. In 
addition, the approach chosen by Castelfranchi (e.g. 2003) on studying normative issues in 
infosociety - permissions, obligations, power, roles, commitments, trust, etc. – and how 
computers might understand them, is an intriguing line of research. This work is approaches 
the trust issue from the more techical point of view, and aims to a formalisation of trust as 
logic (c.f, e.g. Falcone et al 2001 for more on this type of approach). In the most recent work 
of Castelfranchi (Castelfranchi et al 2006) and Camp (Camp 2006) we can also detect an 
interpretation of the current wide-spread interest on translating the real-world, often implicit, 
social networks into online explicitly expressed networks and modelling this.  
 
 
5 Main Results of the Thesis and the Contributions of the 
Author 
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In this chapter, the main results of the work are summarized, and the contributions of the 
author are acknowledged. 
 
5.1 Author's contributions in the thesis 
 
The author has written the introduction, presenting an overview of the research done for the 
publications as well as a background for the studies. The introduction also entails a review of 
the related research in this area, bringing together a representative selection of trust research 
done in a wide area, including both actual HCI research but also those studies on the more 
technical side that come closest to the human side of trust. 
 
[P1] Karvonen, K. (1999). “Creating Trust”, Proceedings of the Fourth Nordic Workshop on 
Secure IT Systems (NordSec'99), November 1-2, 1999, Kista, Sweden, pp. 21-36  
 
The purpose of the first user study was to find out about trust in the form of enquiring about 
users’ current understanding of the security of the Internet as well as to learn about their 
behaviour patterns concerning their usage of the Web and areas that seemed relevant to this 
use. These include areas such as use of email, use of bank services, and use of credit cards. 
Qualitative semi-structured user interviews were chosen as research methodology. The users 
were also presented with a mock-up user interface for a web-based service (group 1) or with 
existing web services (group 2) to trigger conversation about ecommerce and security issues 
related to the transactions of money or private information online. The users were quizzed 
about their current knowledge of computers and banking habits, in order to find out about the 
possible similarities in behaviour in the case of using money regardless of the media. The 
notion of trust was discussed upon on many levels, including questions about trusting friends, 
work colleagues, a bank or a service-provider on the Web.  
 
The first user interviews and evaluations took place in the first days of June 1999 and the 
second in the end of September 1999. In-between the results of the first user study were 
analysed and compared with existing literature. The second set of user interviews was then 
planned with the alterations mentioned above. The user study was planned jointly with 
Markku Laukka, who also conducted part of the interviews with the guidance of the author. 
The analysis and report of the results were the sole work of the author. 
 
The outcomes of the user studies proved quite useful, and the study was repeated later in 
Sweden and Iceland. At the time of the study, such research was still almost non-existent, 
except for the work of (Jarvenpaa et al 2000), so it was one of the first of its kind. The 
Ecommerce Trust Study (Cheskin 1999), appearing at the same time, used partly similar nd 
partly different methodologies, and was producing results that corroborated the validity of the 
outcomes of the user studies. Choice of the methodologies was successful, and the analysis of 
the outcomes was accurate. 
 
[P2] Karvonen, K. (1999). “Enhancing Trust Online”, Proceedings of PhDIT'99: Ethics in 
Information Technology Design. Second International Workshop on Philosophy  
of Design and Information Technology, 16-17 December, 1999, Saint-Ferréol, Toulouse, 
France, pp 57-64  
 
This work presents an ethical concern about trust promotion on a philosophical but also 
practical level. In the paper it is discussed, how ethical or unethical it is to try to enhance trust 
in the end users when in reality the online transactions can never be completely guaranteed. 
The work is completely based on the author’s own ideas and work.  
 
[P3] Nikander, P., Karvonen, K. (2001). “Users and Trust in Cyberspace”, in B. 
Christianson, B. Crispo, J.A. Malcolm, M. Roe (Eds.): Security Protocols, 8th International 
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Workshops Cambridge, UK, April 3-5, 2000, Revised Papers LNCS 2133, Springer-Verlag 
Berlin Heidelberg 2001, pp. 24-35 
 
In this work, the aim was to broaden the view from a protocol-centric approach towards 
considering the actual users, and to provide some initial requirements for future operating 
systems and user interface design in the area of authentication protocol design. To attempt 
this was new, and combining of human and machine trust was new and thought-provoking. 
The initial problem statement of the usability problems in this area is partly based on 
Nikander’s previous work and ideas. All the actual usability problems were identified and 
analysed by the author. The paper represents the results of a tight co-operation of the 
respective authors and is a mutual outcome of their joint work, where both parties were 
contributing to an equal measure.  
 
[P4] Karvonen, K., Cardholm, L., Karlsson, S. (2000). “Cultures of Trust: A Cross-Cultural 
Study on the Formation of Trust in an Electronic Environment”, in  
Proceedings of the Fifth Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems, NordSec 2000, 12-13 
October, 2000, Reykjavik, Iceland, pp. 89-100 
  
In order to see if the results would be valid in another country, and also to see how cultural 
variation might take place, the first user study was repeated in Sweden in 2000, with slightly 
different user group, different sites familiar to the Swedish users, in Swedish language, and by 
Swedish collaborators. The outcome of this study was that there was indeed quite a lot of 
difference which is likely to stem from cultural variation, but due to the different user group 
these results can only be considered as indicative. The user study was planned by the author 
on basis of the first user study, with some minor localisation type of changes made by the 
Swedish collaborators. The user study was run by Cardholm and Karlsson on the basis of 
detailed instructions provided by the author. The analysis of the findings as well as the 
transformation of the results into the format of a publication are the sole work of the author. 
  
[P5] Karvonen, K, Holmström, U. (2000). “Expressing Trust”, in Proceedings of NordiCHI 
2000 (short papers), The First Nordic Conference on Computer-Human  
Interaction, 23-25 October 2000, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden. CD 
Proceedings, ed. Gulliksen et al. 2 pp. 
 
This paper is based on Karvonen and Holmström’s research work on the usability of trust 
mechanisms and identifies the challenges embedded in current trust mechanisms from a 
usability point-of-view. The current situation of the trust mechanisms was presented by 
Holmström. The usability aspects as well as the general framework of usability work in this 
area and their further analysis was done and written by the author, who is the main contributor 
of this paper. The aim of this paper was also to bring the trust and usability of security issues 
to the awareness of the Nordic CHI community.  
 
[P6] Karvonen, K. (2000). “Experimenting with Metaphors for All: A User Interface for a 
Mobile Electronic Payment Device”, in Proceedings of 6th ERCIM Workshop “User 
Interfaces for All” (UI 4 All), 25-26 October, 2000, Convitto della Calza, Florence, Italy, pp. 
183-188 
 
In this paper, a user interface designed in co-operation with and implemented by Markku 
Laukka for handling certificates was placed under two sets of usability tests, with different 
type of setting, in order to test the influence the question types would have on the test 
outcomes. The tests were designed, run, reported and analysed by the author alone. The 
author also participated in inventing the UI metaphors on which the design was based on. The 
UI design choices were based on the results of the user studies presented in publication [P1]. 
The paper presents these usability tests and represents the sole work of the author. 
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[P7] Karvonen, K (2000). “The Beauty of Simplicity”, in Proceedings of the ACM 
Conference on Universal Usability (CUU 2000), November 16-17, 2000, Washington DC, 
USA, pp. 85-90  
 
This paper presents a further analysis of the findings of the user studies of publications [P1], 
[P2] and [P3]. It presents novel and remarkable conclusions made on basis of the conducted 
studies on the importance of aesthetics for the trust formation process. At the time of this 
publication, the recognition of the aesthetics, and other emotional factors in HCI was only 
beginning, and this work is one of the first in reporting it among (Tractinsky 1997, 2000). The 
work was done solely by the author.  
 
[P8] Karvonen, K. (2001): “Designing Trust for a Universal Audience: A Multicultural Study 
on the Formation of Trust in the Internet in the Nordic Countries” (invited paper), in the 
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Universal Access in HCI 
(UAHCI'2001), August 5-10, 2001, New Orleans, LA, USA, Vol. 3, pp. 1078-1082 
 
To further test the effects of culture on trust-formation, the original user study, with some 
slight moderations and with a smaller user group, was again run in Iceland in 2000. Now, the 
cultural variation seemed even stronger and the trust-formation process appeared to be quite 
dissimilar from that of the Finns and Swedes: the cultural factor in trust-formation was quite 
evident, and the cultural variation seemed to be great.  
 
Further, on basis of the analysis of the users studies conducted in the three countries, the 
upsurge of recommendation-based systems for formalising trust expressions and for making 
trust decisions,  seems a natural path for the trust-formation: one of the major outcomes of the 
work at hand is that also in technical environments, humans trust, first and foremost, other 
humans, not machines. Providing users with ways for embedding existing social networks to 
the online environment is a natural application of this outcome (see also Camp 2006, Bonhard 
et al 2006). 
 
The user study in Iceland was planned, run, reported and analysed solely by the author.  
 
[P9] Karvonen, K., Parkkinen, J. (2001). “Signs of Trust”, Proceedings of the 9th 
International Conference on HCI (HCII2001), August 5-10, 2001, New Orleans, LA, USA, 
Vol. 1, pp. 1076-1080 
 
In order to better understand the meaning and effect of the visual elements of web design on 
trust formation, the author invited a colleague who had expertise in semiotic analysis to 
jointly analyse the identified research problems from a semiotic point-of-view. This analysis 
proved to be quite fruitful, leading to a better understanding of the symbolism of the online 
elements. The work was done in tight co-operation jointly by the both authors. Parkkinen 
provided the semiotic framework and the author provided the data to be analysed and fully 
participated in the actual analysis and wrote the publication. 
 
 
5.2 Main results 
 
The main results of the work at hand can be divided into the following areas: 
 
1. Understanding of the affecting factors of trust-formation process in online situations; 
2. Identifying the key issues in trust and usability of security; 
3. The effects of design on trust; 
4. How to apply methods of usability and user-centred design to the study of trust. 
 
These are elaborated on next. 
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5.2.1 Understanding of the affecting factors of trust-formation process in online situations 
 
The answers from our interviews indicate that the affecting factors are in making trust 
decisions in online ecommerce use situations, in order of assumed importance: 
 
0. personal attitude to others (trusting/distrusting) and cultural factors 
1a. previous experience from the specific web-shop, or 1b. real-life vendor 
2a. known brand, or 2b. trustworthy design 
3a. right price, or 3b. secure payment method, 
4. right delivery conditions, 
5. financial or reputational risk on service provider 
6. privacy policy. 
 
A possible chain of decisions made by a customer before a purchase is presented in Figure 2. 
To start with, previous experience from a specific web-shop seems to be a conclusive factor. 
The experience does not necessarily need to be personal; it could come from trusted friends or 
media. Even so, it seems like personal experience has the strongest influence on the 
consumer, especially over time. If a person has successfully completed a purchase in the past, 
the customer would not hesitate to do business with the same service provider again. This 
time the price of the product would be a more decisive consideration. 
 
When considering doing business with a web-shop for the first time, reputation and previous 
experience of the company is very important. A well-known brand is crucial for attracting a 
potential customer. Design of the web site seems to be most important when the service 
provider is unfamiliar. A web site of an unknown service provider must give a professional 
impression and immediate communicate their services. Otherwise, the user will move on. In 
these circumstances is it also more important to provide quick download of pages and easy 
navigation, than it is for known providers. When the consumer is familiar with the company 
behind the web site, the kind of products they have for sale is not an issue. The customer 
knows beforehand what to look for and is probably visiting the site with a special purpose. 
When doing business with an online shop the customers expect prices to be low. As it is easy 
to compare prices on the Internet, a shop with higher prices than others will most likely have 
problems attracting customers. Another factor of interest for our respondents was delivery 
conditions. There is a demand for speedy delivery, preferably all the way to the customer’s 
front door.  
 
At the bottom of the considerations, comes the question of secure payment for deciding 
whether to use a service or not. This is not due to lack of importance but more to the fact that 
the customers do not consider doing business at all with a service provider that does not let 
them pay by invoice. This reality is known to Swedish service providers. In our web site 
evaluation, there was only one foreign service provider (Amazon.com) included and the 
question of paying over the Web was never really an issue. The respondents themselves 
concluded that what they actually do when they are doing business online is what is 
traditionally known as mail ordering. 
 
In the ECommerce Trust Study in 1999, one of the fundamental elements when 
communicating trust was seals of approval. One condition for these seals to be of any 
relevance at all is that they be well known and noticed by the customer. This was not the case 
among the respondents in this study. Hence, the conclusion must be that seals of approval 
have little impact on communicating trustworthiness among Swedish and Finnish web 
consumers, at least for the time being. 
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Figure 2: A flow chart of the transaction process and the trust decisions 
 
 
Users were willing to trust established real-life vendors also online, especially if they were 
controlled by special legislation, e.g. banks. Users would ask for help from the people they 
knew for making the trust decision. Further, the information provided by mass media and the 
services themselves was considered incomprehensible or irrelevant in most cases. The sources 
of trust were manifold, but both other people's experiences and trust in existing institutions 
and real-life vendors came clearly out as the most important criteria for trust. These were the 
most important sources for initial trust. As experiences with a given service accumulated over 
time, the trust was also based on previous successful encounters with the service at hand.  
  
Trust was not an explicit concept for the users. They would in most cases show trust or lack 
of trust via willingness to interact or withdraw from interaction with a given service or any 
online transactions. Users would, in the interviews, most frequently mention ecommerce and 
email usage as the cases where trust would be an issue, when probed for it.  Since trust was 
not an explicit concept for the users, they had a hard time explaining about the meaning of 
trusting or distrusting. Users would express the trust/distrust as a feeling that something is or 
is not “right”. Trusting was shown by willingness to interact with the given service.   
 
 
5.2.2 Identifying the key issues in trust and usability of security 
  
Considering all the research done by us and by others, we can identify the following four 
kinds of problems in making computer security usable as most crucial:  
 
1) People are not interested in computer security per se – they are only interested in what it 
enables.  
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2) People do not understand security technology, concepts or terms – even if they were 
interested.  
3) People do not behave rationally and do what is best for them – even if they did 
understand it.  
4) People do not trust machines, but other people. 
 
The interpretation of these challenges can be rather straightforward. People are not interested 
in security as such, so automation to a certain extent will be a good idea. Another approach 
will be to try to think of ways to make it more interesting in some way. The fact that people 
do not currently understand what computer security is all about, is easier to tackle, in a way: 
we need to find better terminology to use and work hard on providing easy-to-understand 
information about security to the online users. Further, we must take care that the information 
provided covers the areas they are interested in.  
 
To further emphasise the human in the “human problem” we can, on basis of the conducted 
research, rewrite the list provided by (Shneier 2000) as consisting of the following six corner 
stones: 
 
1) how people perceive risks and what they perceive as risks 
2) how computer security could be easier to memorize and to learn 
3) how people could trust computers and the networks and how they could express this trust 
in an easy and understandable way 
4) what part of the computer security could be automated and what cannot be automated; the 
latter must be communicated to the user in an intelligible, easy-to-understand way 
5) how people could learn about computer security and even be interested in it 
6) how people could assure their privacy level to be the one they want and need.  
 
The various research threads of trust research, stemming out of various sources is descriptive 
of the intricacy and complexity of work on this area. It is not likely that we will be witnessing 
answers to these problems too soon. Further, new problems arise as we go along sorting out 
the old ones. 
 
The irrational behaviour of humans is one of the key points to be kept in mind when 
designing usable security: if we design for some sort of imaginary “model citizens”, who 
always behave well, think carefully about the consequences of their actions, and act in their 
own best interest, we end up creating unrealistic application, intended for these virtual beings. 
Instead, the systems designed should be based in the real world needs and capabilities of the 
“average man”. The fact that trusting decisions are often implicit, provides big challenges for 
guiding the users to the “right path”, for they may be unwilling to listen, and unaware of why 
they feel so strongly for something 
 
The fact that people tend not to trust machines, but place their trust in other people, is also a 
crucial conclusion. The usage of online services may not even be really tied to a trust decision 
in a way: if user wants something badly enough, they will engage even in transactions they 
perceive as risky. However, there may not be any trust behind this decision. The upsurge of 
recommender systems, based on reputation have been so successful just because of the fact 
that it enables users to trust other users – an outcome easily deductible from an analysis of the 
results of the user studies presented here.   
 
5.2.3 The effects of design on trust 
 
During this research, a surprising outcome was discovered. The aesthetics of the services used 
seemed quite significant for the trust decisions [P7] and [P9]. This was an unexpected result, 
but was at the same time implicit in previous work (e.g. Cheskin 1999), verified by other 
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research groups around the world, especially by (Tractinsky et al 2000), later by (Norman 
2003) and verified experimentally by e.g. (Riegelsberger 2003) and (Lindgaard et al 2006) 
and further developed by e.g. (Wang 2005), (Yang et al 2005). During the recent years, 
understanding the importance of aesthetics has become mainstream HCI, and is currently 
investigated by many. The outcomes of these studies, along with the understanding on the 
trust mechanisms behind the surface, can be used for building up instructions on how to 
create trusted design.  
 
Based on our work, we can now give some design rules for trustworthy design, even if this 
was not one of the goals of the study at hand and has been dealt with more extensively by 
others, especially (Egger 2003) and (Tractinsky 1999, 2000, Cyr 2006, Kim et al 2003).  
 
The outcomes of this work have further corroborated the outcomes of especially (Egger 
2003), as regard how to design for trust. On basis of our work, we can state that a smart 
security designer should take into account all the factors discussed above and make security 
as carefree as possible at the same time, but also visible to some extent and persuasive as 
well. Special attention needs to be paid to the logic and ease of navigation in during the 
payment process. The basic requirements for trusted design, thus, include the design to be at 
least the following:  
 
• Carefree: Users do not care about security as primary goal. The feel of the design in 
security prone applications should be that of easiness, even fun, and speak the user's 
language. 
 
• Appropriate: Design must support content. No matter how fine the finished design that 
we may create, it may still end up connoting untrustworthiness – this will happen if the 
chosen design style is not in concordance with the content of the service. What this means 
is that the design of, say, a Web bank should be different from the design of an 
entertainment service site. When users were describing their trusting attitudes, they would 
refer to this as saying, for example that “a bank has to look like a bank”. This means that 
a design for a bank needed to denote things such as seriousness, professionalism, and 
solidity. However, how these design ingredients should be interpreted is hard to pinpoint 
(Ecommerce Trust Study 1999, Surendra et al 1999, Lindgaard 2006). 
 
• Familiar: Common look for e-vendors operating in same business areas will benefit all. 
In practice this means, for example that in order to succeed, resemblance across Web-
sites providing similar services is likely to enhance the trustworthy appearance of all 
those vendors. Existing research by others has also shown that this kind of similarity will 
promote the feeling of familiarity in the consumers (e.g. Lindgaard 2006). The 
operational area of the e-vendor will create implicit expectations in the consumer as 
regards the Web design. If these expectations are met, the site is evaluated as more 
trustworthy than otherwise would be the case. Co-operation among vendors active in the 
same area might prove beneficial for all parties. Users must immediately see that the site 
is an ecommerce site, plus where and how to buy. If all the banks, all the book stores, and 
all the travel agencies etc. operating online had a similar appearance (inside each group), 
the consumer would find it more easy to understand which areas they operate on, what to 
expect from these services, and how they operate. 
 
• Usable: The site must also live up to the common ISO usability standards of 
effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction – as any other service should do. In web 
usability, for example, the kind of basic usability principles and practices such as 
described in (Nielsen 1993) should also be followed, when possible. Ease of interactions, 
based on good usability, forms the basis for all good user experiences online. 
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• Creating flow: The transaction process should be swift from start to finish. If there are 
break-ups and considerable waiting periods in getting from one part of the service to the 
other, in the loading of pages, users will become suspicious of the overall competence of 
the service. Especially in the actual transaction procedure, delays are quite intolerable for 
most users, who will shy away from slow or cumbersome transactions, wondering, “What 
is going on in the background” [P1]. If the generic, acceptable waiting time from usability 
point-of-view is about 10 seconds (e.g. Nielsen 1993), in the transaction process the 
tolerance is far smaller, probably practically measured in sub-seconds. 
 
The suggestion for co-operation and similarity online across businesses in the same area is a 
bit uncommon thinking in the world of Web design. Creating a ‘fancy’ and distinguishable 
design has been one of the most sought-after qualities of desirable design. Even though such 
pleasantness should by no means be abandoned, the similarity aspect should also be 
encouraged/developed/nurtured. Differentiation is appropriate for fun and for artistic purposes 
– however, for serious business purposes it is not. Such similarity also promote learnability of 
the site’s structure and functionality, since transfer of previous experience will become 
possible. Perceived similarity is a proven trust promoting factor elsewhere (Fogg 2003), so 
probably also here.  
 
This conclusion goes against the current trend to praise individuality and to try to differentiate 
from competitors with all means possible. In the Web environment, this approach has meant 
that every Web page tries to be different from others. Since the logical elements of the sites of 
businesses in the same area are, however, more or less the same, similarity cannot in fact be 
easily avoided even when not actively being pursued – which might, after all, be a good thing.  
 
The solution so far has been to introduce differences in the level of colours, flashy 
animations, and introductory tours before entering the main site. This policy has proved to be 
harmful for the success of ecommerce. In a way, adopting this differentiating policy has 
meant, from the consumer point of view, hiding the true and apparent functionality and 
purpose of the site from the consumer. This has led to confusion about the purpose of the sites 
and their possibilities. This, in turn, has led to loss of consumer trust towards the online 
vendors. By abiding to the design rules presented above, it will, however, be possible to 
overcome these weaknesses in contemporary Web design approaches, and to create 
trustworthy design for e-vendors.  Perhaps we should not call it Web design in the first place, 
but rather, ecommerce design – with rules of its own, in part different from Web design rules 
(see also Egger 2001, Kim et al 2003). 
 
We have found out that at least the Nordic users preferred “simple design”. In the future, it 
would be interesting to investigate further into what kind of simplicity would be right for 
creating trustworthy design. In the study by (Lindgaard et al 2006) it became obvious that 
what is simple is not that simple (sic). Graphic designers often complain that usability experts 
always want design that is too simple, which they commonly interpret as boring. Simplicity in 
this sense is a kind of “stripped” simplicity – the design is stripped naked of all fancy 
features, colours, and flashy, moving objects. Is this what users really want? Alternatively, 
could there be a second kind of simplicity that they actually mean, “designed” simplicity – 
clear, and “clean” like the Swedish users wanted, but in a stylistic and beautiful way that does 
not lessen the pleasure provided, even if it lessens the elements the page consists of? We think 
it is this latter form of simplicity that is asked for. However, simplicity cannot be advertised 
to end-users under this label – it is a well-known human phenomenon that simplicity is not 
desirable since it is not socially acceptable and because it does not reflect a self-image one 
could be proud of (e.g. Norman 1986). People want more: more buttons, more functionality, 
and they want to see themselves as “experts”, above the average. They do not want to be 
labelled as those who use “simple designs” (Norman 1986). In any case, the importance of 
aesthetics in making trust decisions has become evident, and needs to be studied further, as is 
already happening.  
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5.2.4 How to apply methods of usability and user-centred design to trust 
 
In the user studies in this work, there has been a pursuit to try out various methods, and see 
which would seem to prove best results. However, questionnaires were left out of the study on 
purpose, as were expert interviews: the first due to the fact that such research were already 
ongoing and could be used for comparison of the outcomes; the second due to the fact that in 
the scope of this research, the interest was directed only on the ‘average men and women’ – 
users without expertise. Also, we wanted to try to simulate real use situations as far as 
possible: the usage of demo services and actual services were observed and analysed. This 
work was combined with interviews and usability testing of the created UI designs (see 
Figure 3). 
 
These methods seemed to prove best results when doing research under the described 
circumstances. On basis of quality of the outcomes, we would recommend as most suitable 
methods for studying online trust a mixture of methods, with an emphasis on qualitative 
methods stemming mainly from ethnography (observing usage, interviewing, participatory 
design), enhanced with the traditional usability engineering such as usability evaluations, 
supplemented with some type of experimental test setting (e.g. Lindgaard et al 2006, 
Riegelsberger 2003, Brostoff and Sasse 2003) questionnaires (e.g. Fogg 2003, Cheskin 1999), 
or expert interviews (Cheskin 1999, Tang et al 2003) to validate the findings. The Grounded 
theory framework as applied by Sasse et al might prove useful also in this context.  
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Applying usability methods for studying trust decisions 
 
Interview 
Observe User  
studies 
UI design 
Usability tests
Before usage 
Interview 
After usage 
Iterations 
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6 Conclusions 
 
During the research, it has become obvious that still today, the average user does not know 
much about the security risks nor the security techniques that exist. Thus it is practically of no 
use to give her information about it, at least not if the information given is too complex, and 
there is too much of it. For all these reasons, as much of the security as possible should be 
automatically taken care of on behalf of the user, while at the same time retaining its visibility 
to some level and enabling the feeling of being in control, if not totally responsible, of each 
use situation. The user truly is the weakest link in securing a system. Most security 
mechanisms are far too difficult for the average user to manage. Thus all trouble for making a 
system safe is in vain if the user is left in charge of the security. Yet there is a need to show to 
the user in some way that her security has been taken care of. Some kind of feedback is 
clearly needed. The design of the user interface for any system should, then, take all these 
things into consideration. 
 
There are really no recognised exemplars of good user interface design for secure user 
interfaces as yet (Whitten and Tygar 1998, Salam et al 2003; Camp 2006 will be interesting to 
judge). The six primary components to promote trustworthiness in the user listed by the 
Ecommerce study (Ecommerce Trust Study 1999) were one of the first to even try this. The 
studies reported here verify, to the most part, the findings of that study. The brand name of 
the service provider was one of the key features to enhance trust in the users also in our 
studies. It applies to most other components, except for the seals of approval. These were 
quite unknown to the users who participated in our user studies, and once they were explained 
what they were about, users were very doubtful about their true value. After all, they can be 
seen as ‘mere images’, too (e.g. Camp 2006). 
 
In order for all this research to be useful, quite a lot still needs to be done. First, it is not at all 
clear how the various kinds of trust relationships and their expressions could be turned into 
certificates or other kinds of signed documents, if we think about solution with a centralised 
architecture. Second, the actual user expectations and their probable reactions to various kinds 
of automated trust evaluation mechanisms should be evaluated. Third, even the concepts of 
trust and trustworthiness need more clarification, both in the formal sense and especially in a 
language understandable to the average user. Even if the reputation-based systems working 
via recommendations seem to be dominant at the moment, they too are not without problems 
in the area of trust. The current solutions, such as eBay, rely, for the most, on the fact that 
people are happy to turn a blind eye towards the actual risks of the system and what lacks in 
the security.  
 
It still holds that one of the major challenges in creating more usable computer security is the 
fact that most users do not find it interesting. It is a necessity, often traded off if need be, not 
an end in itself (e.g. Sasse 2003, Yee 2005, DeWitt et al 2006, Schechter et al 2007). Getting 
users to care enough about their own security is one thing, getting them to want to learn more 
about is something else altogether. When it comes to computer security, users tend to get 
scared and shy away from an area they find too complicated to grasp. This is true even for 
those users, who are otherwise into new technology. All the users wish to know about 
computer security, is that exists – that they are safe. 
 
 
6.1 Future Work 
 
In this subchapter, we present some suggestions for possibilities for continuing the work on 
studying trust. 
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6.1.1 Extending the probe on cultural variation 
 
The clear differences in user attitudes affected by cultural factors are one of the cornerstones 
of the current study. Repeating the study with Finnish users, Swedish, and Icelandic users will 
prove interesting results in how time and the new emerging systems have changed the 
attitudes in these three countries. Extending the study to more countries would also be 
interesting. The work on repeating the study in Nordic countries has in fact already started 
with Finnish users (Karvonen 2007), and plans to extend it to include other countries outside 
the Nordic region is also underway. The initial studies suggest that even when users, on one 
hand, seem to have become bolder in their online interactions, on the other hand, the new 
threats of identity theft, for example, are again forming new obstacles for online interactions 
(e.g. Camp 2004). In the end, even when users are interacting more actively in online 
transaction situations, the means to protect oneself, the feelings of distrust, and need for more 
information have more or less remained the same. Since there are also novel factors affecting 
the situation such as the flourishing of recommendation-based systems, the outcomes of the 
whole study are hard to foresee in advance.  
 
There are many ways to pursue further in studying trust. One possibility to continue this line 
of study would be conducting more or less the same interviews with individual users from 
various other cultures, as well as observing these users in real use situations similar to the 
ones described here – performing tasks on the existing, security-prone services, and 
evaluating their trustworthiness in today’s climate of trust. In doing this, we would expect to 
find some differences to previous findings, due to changing behaviour patterns in the 
accumulated timeframe. Special attention could be paid to the theme of “simple design” - 
what this might mean in different cultures and different users, and what the design wishes of 
various groups and subgroups might be. Good example of this are the findings of the study at 
the AT&T Labs-Research (Cranor et al 1999, see section on Privacy) on Net users' attitudes 
towards privacy, where it was concluded that users could be divided into at least three groups 
according to their privacy assessments. All these different groups seem to require different 
user interface designs, emphasizing different aspects of the underlying systems’ security. If 
this still holds today, remains an open issue. 
 
The question of cultural variation continues to be an interesting and pressing theme. On a 
truly global environment like the Internet, to fully succeed in creating services that are 
understandable to all their international users is not possible without taking into account the 
cultural variation in the attitudes, values, likings, aesthetical taste and trust structures of users 
across continents (Jarvenpaa et al 1999, 2000, and Tractinsky 2000 for a number of 
references). On the other hand, a global convergence might also happen. The global culture of 
the Internet might start to overcome the local cultures and expectations they bring along, as 
the usage is mature enough. For making global research across cultures in a new way, 
(Masten and Plowman 2003) are using digital ethnography, where the basic assumptions 
include such globally more or less similar techno-culture as generic framework6. It remains to 
be seen how successful this approach will be. 
 
6.1.2 The role of design and aesthetics for trust 
 
Still unclear remains also the component of “presentation”.  It only states that quality design 
connotes professionalism. However, what, then, is quality design? In our studies, the users 
mentioned clarity as one of the key features that made visiting a web site most pleasurable. 
By clarity, it was meant that there were just a few elements on the screen, few commercials if 
any and navigation was found to be straightforward and easy. It is possible, however, that 
                                                     
6 The main emphasis in this article is, however, on trying out a new research methodology for conducting user studies on geographically distributed 
users simultaneously. 
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these findings reflect the Finnish user specifically and thus the results cannot be generalised 
to a more international group of users. Previous research from field such as aesthetics that 
have over time created an understanding of issues related to “quality”, “pleasurable” and, 
naturally, “aesthetic” would likely be useful to study such issues, and this possibility was 
introduced in a separate study [P7]. Indeed, later on the study of the meaning and significance 
of aesthetics has become an important trail in current study of trust and within the field of UX 
(e.g. Lindgaard et al 2006, with a good reference list and recent findings on studying the 
aesthetic ingredient; see also Kim et al 2003). 
 
These differences in design do not touch just the language but also the way people with 
different cultural backgrounds perceive privacy, security and what or who they can trust and 
on what basis, and the aesthetic question must be dealt in concordance with the study on 
cultural variations in trust-formation. The culture specific traits of both the design and the 
service must be recognised and translated along the language (e.g. Hawkings 1999). It is not 
enough to change the language of the user interface; the changes must go deeper than that.  
A Trustmark displayed on the home page of the service provider may inform the visitors of 
the security practices conducted at that site, but what is considered assuring enough may vary 
greatly across different cultures. This point was also investigated further, to some extent, by 
repeating the user studies reported here in Sweden [P4] and in Iceland [P8]. Indeed, 
differences between the neighbouring countries, Finland and Sweden appeared to be rather 
small, whereas Icelanders exhibited rather different trusting behaviour than the other 
Scandinavians [P8] – so there was a considerable amount of heterogeneity already within 
geographically rather small area. 
 
 
6.1.3 Making security more interesting, or even fun 
 
We have seen how in security, we are faced with users who are not only reluctant but also 
scared, bored and bothered by our goal of providing them with more security. It is a good 
question, how to turn the wheel. However, examples of funny and entertaining computer 
security information also exist. When computer security information is targeted at children, 
things can change drastically. A good example is Disney’s web pages 
(http://disney.go.com/surfswell/index.html), where children – and why not their parents – can 
delve into “Adventures in Internet Safety” in “Surf Swell Island”. There, the user is 
wandering through “virus cave”, “privacy falls”, and “temple of tact”, learning on the way the 
basics of computer security and online etiquette via answering some simple questions and 
receiving immediate feedback for right and wrong answers.  
 
The approach that turns computer security into a quiz and a game could provide some ideas 
for how to present the computer security issues also to grown-ups. Even when using cartoons 
and animations may not be the best way to convince users and promote trust in the advice 
given (Cheskin 1999), when well applied some of the idea might lead away from the technical 
jargon and towards an easy-to-use set of security information and advice. In addition, cutting 
the information into smaller chunks on every level is advisable (Ackerman et al 2005, Yee 
2005, Uzun et al 2007).  
 
6.1.4 The Emotional consumer 
 
Consumer studies come close to trust studies within HCI when the object of study is trust and 
behaviour in the context of online shopping. Users, in the role of consumers, are likely to act 
differently than in situations where money is not an issue, and the theories of marketing 
research and consumer research have a lot to give. I hope that we will witness an upswing in 
studies combining these approaches. 
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Introducing personal psychology and consumer satisfaction are closely related to the recent 
major trend inside HCI: the study of feelings as an integral part of this interaction. This trend 
has several sources. Firstly, the previous concentration on the cognitive, rational factors in 
how humans behave was simply too narrow in scope. That paradigm was naturally born out 
of the earlier concentration on work environments, where computers first were used. Taking 
the affective side of human into account was a natural step, as the field as a whole has 
matured (c.f. Picard 1997 for groundbreaking work towards this expansion of the field in 
scope). 
 
Secondly, the study of HCI has left the office and entered the user’s spare time, treating users 
of machines not only as workers but also as individuals with personalities, likings and 
dislikings, and so on. Studying the affective side of HCI follows naturally with these new 
directions. When the computers are used not only to accomplish chores dictated by others, but 
as tools for personal fulfilment, for socializing, for art-making – it is no longer enough to 
study just the cognitive side of the human participant of this interaction in order to improve 
effectiveness. Further, considering this side sets novel requirements of novel types for the 
machines possibly unheard of before, and sets the development of these devices towards new 
directions. The applications run on these systems these days may be immersive games or 
chats or dating services that by nature are designed to entertain and deal with feelings, more 
so than to appeal to the information processor inside the brain. Even more, this information 
processing is no longer treated as a property of the brain alone, but intelligence needed in 
rational decision-making is constantly detected also elsewhere (e.g. Lindgaard et al 2006).  
 
This new approach is, however, built on the existing knowledge on ‘traditional usability’ of 
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction – this basic level of usability, consisting of things 
like memorability, learnability, and so on, is needed as basis for the emotional level to be built 
on in order for it to be possible and to work. Emotion-provoking, immersive experiences need 
the traditional aspects of usability as their groundwork in order to be able to fulfil their goals, 
i.e., to evoke feelings. The development from physical ergonomics some 60 years ago to 
today’s analysis of the entertaining elements of computer games and online environments and 
virtual communities seems long yet natural and follows a logical path. 
 
In the light of the above, it is also natural, then that also the in the study of trust the emotional, 
irrational side has gained a lot of attention. As we have seen, trust is by its very nature built in 
part on cognition and on the other part on emotion. The trust research has not yet, however, 
been integrated too well with the emotion research inside HCI, but has remained more or less 
as an isolated field.  
 
6.2 Epilogue 
 
Even if there are many problems in trust that remain unresolved, online shopping seems to 
have undergone a major shift from distrust to trusting (or carefree) behaviour. This becomes 
inevitable by current consumer studies on users’ online buying behaviours. For example, the 
Christmas study ordered by Deloitte in 20057, showing an outstanding growth in the amount 
of gift shopping among British consumers (see Table 2). 
 
In other words, in the U.K  over 50% of the consumers was at least planning to purchase gifts 
and services online for Christmas 2005. The reasons behind choosing to conduct shopping 
online, are manifold, ranging from better prizes to better availability, and so on. Table 3 
summarises these factors. 
 
                                                     
7 http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/press_release/0,1014,sid%253D2834%2526cid%253D103623,00.html  
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Year  Consumer use of internet for purchasing gifts 
2005 51%
2004 32%
2003 29%
2002 22%
2001 12%
2000 11%
1999 8%
1998 2%
 Table 2. Seven years of the Internet for Christmas gift shopping (Deloitte 2005) 
 
 
Year   2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  
Better quality goods/ services  4% 4% 3% 3%  2%  
Easy to return goods  0% 5% 0% 3%  2%  
Easy to get credit 0% 3% 2% 0%  0%  
Good customer service   2% 7% 0% 1%  2%  
Convenient      35% 19% - -  -  
Quick delivery to home      14% 15% 11% 11%  10%  
Browse for products/ services without hassle   15% 17% 16% 16%  12%  
Saves time   20% 16% 27% 22%  30%  
Saves money       - 11% 19% 23%  20% 
Prefer the online shopping experience         - - 2% 3%  3%  
Other    11% 3% 12% 10%  14%  
Don't know   0% 0% 8% 9%  5%  
 Table 3. Reasons for using the Internet (Deloitte 2005) 
 
According to the Deloitte study, Internet is alluring especially to such users who have learned 
that a low price does not equal low quality. One of the major ingredients in online shopping 
creating competitive edge is still low price, and saving time. Using Fogg’s terminology, the 
trust is here based on “Earned Credibility”: the users have first-hand experience, extending 
over time, about doing online transactions..  
 
This positive trend of growth in online shopping is threatened, especially in the U.S., by the 
fear of identity theft. This phenomenon and its relation to local and global legislature should 
be investigated soon within trust research, since this fear might jeopardize this growth. Some 
examples of work in this area are already emerging (e.g. Camp 2004). Why the convenience 
factor has disappeared from the factors having an effect, was not explained in the study 
outcomes, unfortunately. However, it is interesting to learn that the shops flourishing online 
and making the best profits are multi-channel vendors, instead of pure online merchants. 
According to the study, women were more likely to use supermarket (54%) and high street 
store websites (62%) than men were, where as men would use manufacturers’ sites more 
often (48%). This is potentially bad news for “pure play” online retailers. In the wake of the 
recent focus on so-called “dual pricing” for online trading, it could be seen as a further boost 
for established multi-channel retailers. 
 
The user interface design for secure user interfaces is still in making, as is proper 
understanding of what is trust. To get to the core of trustworthy design has proven a hard nut 
to crack. Thus, as the users’ expectations vary quite a lot, the mechanisms are not quite there 
yet, and it is unclear how the implementation of such mechanisms would affect the design and 
structure of operating systems and user interfaces, this work has not progressed too far as yet. 
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However, we wish that the work presented here would help in leading to new ideas and points 
of view about how to build easy-to-use security for the online world and how to deal with its 
users, preferably eventually leading to an Internet that is more secure, in practice, than the 
current one. Understanding the making of unbroken security on a general, deeper, device-
independent level, namely, understanding what makes people trust other people or machines 
and how this trust builds, may serve as key in understanding what kind of security threats and 
other trust issues we will confront also in the future. Taking a closer look at the counterpart of 
trust, the distrust might be fruitful.  
 
It has become clear that usable security is hard, and in the future, the people still present the 
biggest challenge to the designer of the computer security systems: users do not always know 
what is in their best interests. This is also the case in the real world, where many decide to 
place their trust in fortune-tellers and horoscopes even in important life-forming decisions. 
However, the studies reported here have clearly improved our understanding of the 
differences between the trust as expressed by humans and between humans, as compared with 
the traditional technical expressions of trust. I hope that the results of these studies will help 
to bring these two closer to one another in the future, and have managed to show the true 
value of the outcomes received by executing the user-centred approach in usability of 
security. The ultimate aim of this work is to show way and provide means to more usable 
security – to provide building blocks for the bridge between human and machine trust, 
transforming the “human problem” in security into the “human challenge”.  
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8 Appendix: User interview structure 
 
8.1  General questions 
The semi-structured interviews contained questions to establish the user’s general experiences 
and thoughts of online shopping. The questions were divided into eight groups.  
 
User study on Trust functions Date: Ref.No: 
1 Background  
1.1 Sex: (M) (F) 1.2 Age: yrs 1.3 Education:  
2 Use experience 
2.1 Computers, money card (cash card), credit cards, bank cards, other cards 
 
2.2 Automats: cash machine (ATM), ticket automat 
 
2.3 The web: For how long has the user been using the Web? How often? 
 
2.4 Ecommerce (as a consumer) 
 
2.5 Electronic library services 
 
2.6 Does the user have a home page? If yes, what kind of information is there? 
 
2.7 Email: does the user use email, which post service/program does she use? 
 
2.8 Other information the user might want to add 
 
3 Differences between different means of payment 
3.1 What, in your opinion, are the most significant differences between different means of payment? For 
example, when would you rather use credit card than cash or the other way round? 
 
3.2 What is the difference between bankcard and credit card? 
Do you use them differently? 
 
3.3 What is the difference between money card (cash card) and bankcard? 
 
3.4 What kind of cards are you normally using  
 
3.4.1 Why did you choose these? 
 
3.4.2 Are there some deficiencies in these that you have noticed? 
 
3.4.3 Are there some features missing that you would like to have? 
 
3.4.4 Have you ever had any trouble using these means of payments?
If yes, what kind? 
 
3.5 What about automats (ATM)? Have you ever had trouble with them? 
 
3.6 What means of payment do you use when travelling? Why? 
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4 Internet banking and online services of banks 
4.1 Do you use the online services of your bank? 
If yes, where and when?  
(Yes) (No) 
At: (Home) (Work)  Other and when:  
4.1.1 How did you start using these services? 
 
4.1.2 What was the motivator? 
 
4.1.3 Did someone help you with it? 
 
4.1.4 How did you find out about the online services? 
 
4.1.5 Do you friends/relatives/work colleagues use these services? 
 
4.1.6 Do you trust the online services of your bank? Why? Why not? 
 
4.1.7 Have you, or anyone you know, had any trouble with these services? 
 
4.1.8 Do you have any ideas of how to make these services better? Are there some features you are missing 
on the service? 
 
4.2 Do you trust your bank? Why? Why not?  
 
4.3 Is your bank domestic or foreign? Does it make any difference to you what the nationality of your bank 
is? 
(Domestic) (Foreign) (Makes a difference) (Makes no difference) 
 
 
 
5 Ecommerce 
5.1 Have you ever done any business online? (Yes) (No) 
5.2 If YES, do you remember what it was like?  
 
5.2.1 Which services did you use?  
 
5.2.2 Do you have some favourites?  
 
5.2.3 Are your experiences good or bad?  
(Good) (Bad) (Mixed) 
 
5.2.4 How did you pay for your purchases? 
 
5.3 If NO, why do you think you have not used any of these services?  
 
5.4 Do you think you might use them in the future? 
 
5.5. Do your friends/relatives/work colleagues use ecommerce?  
 
5.5.1 Which services do they use, that you know of? 
 
5.6 Does it matter to you whether the service provider is domestic or foreign? Why? 
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5.7 What do you think of giving information about yourself on the Web? Would you welcome email with 
special offers from the service you have used, for example? 
 
 
6 Email 
6.1 What kind of messages do you send? What are they about? To whom? 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Do you write about private matters in your email? What would you consider too private to be written on 
email? 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Have you ever thought that someone else (a third party) might be going through your email? Do you 
care? 
 
 
 
 
7 Passwords and log in 
7.1 What do you think of the use of passwords in general? Are they a good or a bad way to control access to 
systems?  
 
 
 
 
7.2 Do you have a password on your computer? (Yes) (No) 
7.3 Is it easy or difficult to remember passwords? Do you have passwords written down somewhere? 
 
 
 
7.3.1 What about your credit card/bank card PIN? 
 
 
 
7.4 What kind of passwords do you use? Do you use the same password in many places? 
 
 
 
 
7.5 Can you think of a better way to control access than passwords? 
 
 
 
 
 
8 (Computer) security issues 
8.1 Do you ever discuss issues related to computer security with anyone? 
If yes, where and when?  
(Yes) (No) 
At: (Home) (Work)  Other and when:   
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8.2 Do you have knowledge about cases of misuse? For example, have you ever heard about somebody 
hacking into some system that was considered to be safe? 
 
8.3 Have you read about cases like this in the newspapers/seen in on TV? [Show article] 
 
 
8.4 Has this kind of information affected your behaviour somehow? For example, have you stopped using 
some service? 
 
 
8.5 Has anything like that ever happened to you or someone you know personally?  
Could you tell more about it? 
 
 
8.6 How do you get information about security issues? Do you think you are able to get the right 
information? 
 
 
8.7 How do you decide whether you can trust some service? What do you base your decision on? 
 
 
8.8 What about security risks? What kind of security risks do you know of? What should not be done, while, 
for example, surfing on the Internet? Why/why not? 
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8.2  Website related questions 
 
The second part of the interviews contained questions to identify the factors of trust most 
likely to influence the user when deciding whether to trust a service provider or not. 
 
Note: Observations and instructions in brackets ( ). (mark down which category the user 
chooses) 
 
8.2.1 Basic information 
 
What category is evaluated? ____________________ 
and what websites are included in the category? 
A)_______________________ 
B)_______________________ 
 
What date was the study performed (A) and what is the reference-code (B)? 
A)_______________________ 
B)_______________________ 
 
You should provide the user with the chance to ask any questions she might have about the 
user study.  
 
If the user is unfamiliar with any of the sites – start with that one. This gives the interviewer a 
better chance to see what parts of the site triggers the user’s interest or annoyance, which then 
may be compared to the more familiar site. 
 
Please note which browser (brand and version) is used and if the machine is a PC, Macintosh 
or other. 
 
Brand, version Machine 
Internet Explorer,  ver: ____ (PC) (Mac) (Other:__________) 
Netscape Communicator,  ver: ____  
Other:_____________,  ver: ____  
 
8.2.2 Questionnaire structure 
 
The questionnaire is divided in six different parts, based on the eCommerce Trust study. The 
parts are: 
 
1. Presentation  
2. Navigation  
3. Brand  
4. Fulfilment 
5. Up-to-date Technology 
6. Seals of Approval 
 
The idea is to go through the pages of each service (two services of one category) and discuss 
the contents and the outlook of the pages at the same time. The interviewer should observe the 
user’s behaviour and make some questions every now and then. Website (A) (repeated for 
(B)) 
 
1 – Presentation 
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(ask the user to stop on the main page and to give an evaluation of it first and only then ask 
her to proceed) 
 
Do you find layout of the pages stylish/ unstylish? Why? 
(Stylish) (Unstylish) 
 
Are you pleased with the layout? Does it “attract the eye”? 
(Yes) (No) 
 
Do you find the pages being outstanding and professional, or rather quite the opposite? Can 
you say why? 
(Professional) (Not professional) 
 
What would you design differently? How would you improve the pages? 
 
2 – Navigation 
Is navigation easy? (note: it is better to observe here more than to ask questions) 
(Easy) (Difficult) 
 
(Can the user find what she is looking for?) Can you find what you are looking for? 
(Easy) (Difficult) 
 
Do you know how to get back to the main page? 
(Easy) (Difficult) 
 
Does something annoy you? 
(Yes) (No) 
 
Do you have any ideas how to change the structure of the pages? 
(Yes) (No) 
 
 
3 – Brand 
Have you heard of this service provider before? Where from? 
(Yes) (No) 
 
 
Have you heard of this service before? Where from? 
Have you seen these pages before? 
(Yes) (No) 
 
 
Have you used this service before? Why? 
(Yes) (No) 
 
Have you used any other services from the service provider? What and why? 
(Yes) (No) 
 
Do the pages seem convincing? 
(Yes) (No) 
 
Would you consider purchasing something? Why? 
(Yes) (No) 
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4 – Fulfilment 
(Does the user seem to know what is going on? Is she surfing in an ordered or in a random 
way?)  
(Ordered) (Random) 
 
Do you get what you want? 
(Yes) (No) 
 
Can you cancel the transaction somehow?  
(Easy) (Difficult) 
 
Can you find more information about how the pages or the service work? 
(Easy) (Difficult) 
 
Is there something that you would like to know but cannot find any information about?  
(Yes) (No) 
 
Do you find the pages trustworthy or untrustworthy? Can you say why? 
(Trustworthy) (Untrustworthy) 
 
What if there is problem? What can be done?  
Can you find any advice on that?  
(Easy) (Difficult) 
 
Do you feel treated as an ordinary customer in a “shop on the street” or more like a mail order 
customer concerning your consumer rights etc? Why? 
(Street) (Mail) 
 
 
5 – Up-to-date Technology 
Do you find the pages technology-wise backward or high-tech? What makes you think so? 
(High-tech) (Not high-tech) 
 
 
Do you find the service easy-to-use? Why? Why not? 
(Easy) (Difficult) 
 
Are there some technical features missing on the service that you would like to find there? 
 
Which one of the tried webservices in this study do you find the most high-tech? 
 
(Does it seem like the user knows what she is doing? Can she use all the features of the 
service, e.g. search engines? Does she appear confused? Does she have any problems going 
through the pages?) 
 
 
6 – Seals of Approval 
Do you know what these are? (explain if she doesn’t) 
(Yes) (No) 
 
Do you ever remember seeing any ever before, while surfing? 
(Yes) (No) 
 
Are there any on these pages? 
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(Yes) (No) (Easy to find) (Difficult to find) (Not applicable) 
 
Did you notice them before I asked? 
(Yes) (No) (Not applicable) 
 
(does the user read the information of the seals on the Net?) 
(Yes) (No) (Not applicable) 
 
How do you feel about them? Do they seem trustworthy to you? Why? 
(Trustworthy) (Not trustworthy) (Not applicable) 
 
Are there any seals of approval from the real world that you think might fit in here?  
(probe: explained if the user does not know what a seal of approval is) 
(Yes) (No) 
 
 
Finally 
 
The user is asked to discuss the Web services in general, and to compare the two services she 
just saw (the comparison is, however, not an issue in itself, but might give some insight into 
why the service appears the way it does to the user). 
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